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Issues in the Third Circuit
BANKRUPTCY LAW-DISCHARGING STUDENT LOANS UNDER 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) (8) (B): FIND SOME DEPENDENTS, MAKE A FEW PAYMENTS
AND DISCONNECT THE CABLE TELEVISION (A DISCUSSION OF
PENNSYL VANIA HIGHER ED UCA TION ASSISTANCE AGENCY V
FA ISH' (IN RE FAI SM
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1977, there was no official provision regarding the dis-
chargeability of educational loans, and as a result, the generally accepted
rule was that such loans were dischargeable in bankruptcy.' With its inclu-
sion as part of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, however, section 523(a) (8)
put to rest the perception that educational loans were typically dischargea-
ble.2 Under section 523(a) (8), an educational loan is not dischargeable
1. Darrell Dunham & Ronald A. Buch, Educational Debts Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 22 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 679, 680 (1992) (citing Lee v. Board of Higher
Educ., 1 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979)). As there had been no provision
regarding the dischargeability of educational debt, the widely held view was that
educational loans fell within the category of debt that should be discharged so that
debtors might "turn the corner financially without being indefinitely burdened
with debt." Thad Collins, Note, Forging Middle Ground: Revision of Student Loan Debts
in Bankruptcy as an Impetus to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8), 75 IowA L. REv. 733,
733 (1990) (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). This rea-
soning appeared to conform with the overall policy underlying the implementa-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code, as recognized in early Supreme Court decisions. See
Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244 ("[The] purpose of the [Bankruptcy Code is] of public as
well as private interest, in that it gives the honest but unfortunate debtor who sur-
renders for distribution property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of preexisting debt."); Williams v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (stating that Bankruptcy Code existed to
"relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes"). Congress, however, responded to a rapidly rising default
rate among student borrowers by enacting section 439A of the United States Code
in 1976, making student loan obligations nondischargeable. Peter B. Barlow, Note
& Comment, Nondischargeability of Educational Debts Under Section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code; Equitable Treatment of Cosigners and Guarantors ?, 11 BANI'JR. DEv. J.
481, 488 (1994-1995). As part of the Education Amendments of 1976, Congress
enacted section 439A, which was a first step toward resolving the perceived abuses
committed by student debtors. Dunham & Buch, supra, at 680 & n.3 (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1087 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2678 (1978)).
By its terms, section 439A applied to cases commencing on or after September 30,
1977. Id. Section 439A was repealed in 1978 and replaced by a similar provision,
section 523(a) (8) of the U.S.C., as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
Barlow, supra, at 488. For the text of section 523(a) (8), see infra note 3.
2. Collins, supra note 1, at 733. Congress enacted section 523(a) (8) as a re-
sponse to growing concerns that recent college graduates were abusing the student
(1087)
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unless: (A) the loan became due more than seven years prior to the
debtor's filing of the bankruptcy petition or (B) repayment of the debt
would cause "undue hardship" on the debtor and his or her dependents. 3
loan program by borrowing to receive an education and then filing for bankruptcy
shortly after graduation. Id. at 734; see Barlow, supra note 1, at 488 (stating that
enactment of section 523(a) (8) occurred "in response to the tremendous number
of abuses of the bankruptcy system by student obligors, with some eighty percent
of bankruptcy actions brought to discharge student loan liability occurring within
three years of the students leaving school"). The ability for graduates to discharge
their debts even before they began what could be lucrative careers, without ever
having to account for their ability or inability to repay their loans, had been char-
acterized as a "loophole" that Congress addressed through section 523(a) (8). Col-
lins, supra note 1, at 733 & nn.7, 8; see also Caspar W. Weinberger, Reflections on the
Seventies, 8 J.C. & U.L. 451, 455 (1981) (stating that former Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare perceived dischargeability of educational debt as "substan-
tial loophole" in educational loan system that needed to be rectified). Evidently,
financial advisors were counselling students actively to take advantage of the loop-
hole by filing for bankruptcy. Collins, supra note 1, at 734 n.7. Comments to the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws' Model Bankruptcy Code, presented to Con-
gress in 1973, revealed that the Commission believed nondischargeability of educa-
tional loans was necessary to protect the public image of the student loan program.
Kurt Wiese, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: The Bankruptcy Court Tests of
"Undue Hardship, "26 Amiz. L. REv. 445, 448 (1984) (citing REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I,
at 170 (1973)); see also Douglass G. Boshkoff, Debtor Protection at the Close of the Twen-
tieth Century, 23 CAP. U. L. REv, 379, 384 (1994) (noting that many members of
Congress favored complete nondischargeability of educational loans).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994). Section 523(a) (8) states, in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under section 727... of this title does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded
in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for
an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholar-
ship or stipend, unless ...
(A) such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became
due more than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the re-
payment period) before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will im-
pose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents.
Id. When Congress originally drafted section 523(a) (8), the time period for allow-
ance of discharge under section 523(a) (8) (A) was five years, but Congress
amended the subsection in 1991, requiring the debt to be seven years old before
permitting a debtor to petition for discharge of his or her educational debt. Dun-
ham & Buch, supra note 1, at 692-93. Nevertheless, a debtor may not simply re-
ceive deferments for substantial portions of the seven year period and then have
his or her debt discharged. Id. at 694-95. Rather, when the debtor receives a
deferment or suspension of the debt, the seven year limitation period is tolled. Id.
Although there is significant case law regarding section 523(a) (8) (A), most litiga-
tion regarding section 523(a) (8) relates to the term "undue hardship" as used in
section 523(a)(8)(B). Id. at 695. For a discussion of courts' interpretations of
what constitutes undue hardship for purposes of section 523(a) (8) (B), see infra
notes 21-138 and accompanying text.
1088
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While it is relatively simple to determine whether an educational loan
became due more than seven years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, courts have struggled with the issue of what constitutes "undue
hardship."4 Nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code is the term "undue hard-
ship" defined.5 Therefore, courts have been forced to rely on section
523(a) (8) (B)'s legislative history when attempting to discern the require-
ments that must be fulfilled to permit dischargeability.
6
Without a clear statutory definition of "undue hardship," courts have
used legislative history to create different tests aimed at determining when
exception from discharge of educational debt would impose an undue
hardship on the debtor.7 The courts, however, have consistently inter-
4. Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 695; see Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assist-
ance Agency v. Faish (In reFaish), 72 F.3d 298, 299-300 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Correll v. Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh (In re Correll), 105 B.R. 302, 305 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1989) (describing confusion of courts that have attempted to define "un-
due hardship")).
5. Collins, supra note 1, at 735; see also Hawkins v. Buena Vista College (In re
Hawkins), 187 B.R 294, 297 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995) (acknowledging that Bank-
ruptcy Code does not define "undue hardship"); Ipsen v. Higher Educ. Assistance
Found. (In re Ipsen), 149 B.R. 583, 585 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (concluding that
because Bankruptcy Code does not define "undue hardship," bankruptcy court has
discretion to determine if facts of individual case warrant ruling that debt be dis-
charged); Conner v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n (In re Conner), 89 BR.
744, 747 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1988) (recognizing that meaning of "undue hardship" is
not explained within legislative history or Bankruptcy Code); Bryant v. Penn-
sylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 914 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that Bankruptcy Code does not define "undue hardship").
6. Wiese, supra note 2, at 447.
The [undue hardship] exception is difficult to apply because the drafters
of the Bankruptcy Code did not define undue hardship. The drafters
said that bankruptcy courts must decide undue hardship on a case-by-case
basis, considering all of a debtor's circumstances. Looking for guidance
in undue hardship cases, the bankruptcy courts have shaped facts and
circumstances tests of undue hardship by relying on the legislative history
of section 523(a) (8).
Id. The Third Circuit has stated that the main legislative purpose of section
523(a) (8)(B) was "'to prevent abuses in and protect the solvency of educational
loan programs."' Pelkowski v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Pelkowski), 990
F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re
Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 1992)). The court came to this conclusion
after observing that congressional debate regarding section 523 (a) (8) (B) centered
on "the twin goals of rescuing the student loan program from fiscal doom and
preventing abuse of the bankruptcy process by undeserving debtors." Id. For a
more complete discussion of the Third Circuit's examination in Pelkowski of sec-
tion 523(a) (8)'s legislative history, see infra notes 120-21, 151 and accompanying
text.
7. E.g., Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395
(2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (determining appropriate test to be broken into three
prongs examining current inability to repay, future inability to repay, and good
faith efforts to repay); Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915 (holding that educational debt may be
discharged if debtor's annual gross income is below federal poverty guidelines or
upon showing of "unique" or "extraordinary" circumstances warranting dis-
charge); Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In reJohnson),
5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) (employing tripartite test that
1996] CASEBRIEF 1089
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preted "undue" as signifying Congress's desire to place a heavy burden on
the debtor who attempts to shake free from self-imposed educational
debt.8 Although courts across the country have promulgated numerous
tests for determining undue hardship, they have tended to apply one of
three tests when dealing with a Chapter 7 debtor who seeks to have his or
her loans discharged pursuant to section 523(a) (8) (B): (1) the Johnson
test;9 (2) the Bryant test;10 or (3) the Brunner test.11
In Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re
Faish),12 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit faced a
situation in which a Chapter 7 debtor sought to have her educational
loans discharged pursuant to section 523(a) (8) (B). 13 Although bank-
ruptcy courts within the Third Circuit had developed the Johnson and Bry-
ant tests, the circuit court itself had never expressed which of the various
tests for determining undue hardship it would accept as controlling within
the circuit.I4 Following a thorough discussion of the Johnson, Bryant and
Brunner tests, the Third Circuit in Faish determined that the Brunner un-
due hardship test would govern in the circuit's bankruptcy courts. 15
This Casebrief discusses the various undue hardship tests applied by
the circuit and bankruptcy courts regarding the discharge of educational
included "mechanical," "good faith" and "policy" prongs). For a further discussion
regarding these tests, and other tests that have been promulgated by bankruptcy
courts across the country, see infra notes 21-138 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Virginia State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Dillon, 189 B.R. 382, 384
(W.D. Va. 1995) (stating that student loans are typically nondischargeable and that
burden is on debtor to establish that his or her circumstances justify discharge);
Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752,
756 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (acknowledging that student loans must be difficult to dis-
charge if student loan program is to survive), affd, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987)
(per curiam); see also Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 702 ("Congress clearly
intended that most educational debt still due within seven years of graduation
should be nondischargeable.").
9. See Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 544 (discussing framework of its
tripartite test). For a discussion of the tripartite Johnson test, including other
courts' perceptions of the test, see infra notes 33-64 and accompanying text.
10. See Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915 (describing components of its poverty-level test).
For a discussion of the Bryant test, see infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
11. See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (laying out its three-prong analysis). For a
discussion of the Brunner test, and its acceptance by other courts, see infra notes 79-
103 and accompanying text.
12. 72 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2532 (1996).
13. Id. at 299-301. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding and analysis
in Faish, see infra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
14. Faish, 72 F.3d at 299-300. The District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania had applied a modified version of the Johnson undue hardship test
and determined that Faish's educational loans were not dischargeable. Penn-
sylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), Ch. 7 No. 94-1353,
slip op. at 4 & n.2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1995).
15. Faish, 72 F.3d at 306. The Third Circuit determined that it had to take
action and adopt a standard for reviewing the presence of undue hardship because
of the considerable amount of confusion among courts within the circuit regard-
ing the applicable legal standard. Id. at 299-300 & n.1.
1090
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debt pursuant to section 523(a) (8) (B), and the Third Circuit's decision to
adopt the Brunner test as controlling within the circuit.16 Part II of this
Casebrief examines the various tests that have been developed and utilized
by circuit and bankruptcy courts across the United States to determine
whether a debtor has met his or her burden of establishing that repayment
of educational debt will impose an undue hardship. 17 Next, Part III dis-
cusses the Third Circuit's examination of the various tests in Faish.18 Addi-
tionally, Part III of the Casebrief includes a discussion of why the Third
Circuit chose to adopt the Brunner test.1 9 Finally, Part IV of this Casebrief
examines the implications of the Third Circuit's decision in Faish and of-
fers insight into what a Chapter 7 debtor can do to convince a court within
the Third Circuit that he or she will suffer undue hardship if the educa-
tional loans are not discharged pursuant to section 523(a) (8) (B).20
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TESTS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES REGARDING
WHAT CONSTITUTES "UNDUE HARDSHIP"
With its requirement that educational loans are nondischargeable un-
less exception from discharge would result in undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents, section 523(a) (8) (B) has severely
limited the ability of Chapter 7 debtors to discharge their educational
debt.21 Although promulgation of the section clarified Congress's posi-
16. For a discussion regarding the tests for determining the existence of un-
due hardship and the standard applied by the Third Circuit in Faish, see infra
notes 33-103, 119-38 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the tests applied by bankruptcy courts across the coun-
try to determine whether repayment of student loans will constitute an undue
hardship on the debtor, see infra notes 21-103 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis and interpretation of the
pre-existing undue hardship tests, see infra notes 104-38 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasons for adopting the Brunner
test as the applicable legal standard in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 119-38 and
accompanying text.
20. For an analysis regarding potential implications of the Third Circuit's
holding and various approaches practitioners may use to carry the burden of estab-
lishing undue hardship when representing Chapter 7 debtors, see infra notes 139-
84 and accompanying text.
21. See Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 680 (stating that Congress enacted
section 523(a)(8) as response to trend of students filing for bankruptcy, even
though section 523 (a) (8) was criticized for its "discriminatory treatment of student
loans as opposed to other loans"). Prior to the promulgation of section 523(a) (8),
Congress had ruled that Guaranteed Student Loans were nondischargeable.
Wiese, supra note 2, at 446 n.12; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 133 (1977), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6094 ("[E]ducational loans are different from
most loans. They are made without business considerations, without security, with-
out cosigners, and rely[ I for repayment solely on the debtor's future increased
income resulting from the education. In this sense, the loan is viewed as a mort-
gage on the debtor's future."); Collins, supra note 1, at 734 ("By enacting section
523(a) (8) ... Congress intended to impair the ability of students to file for bank-
ruptcy immediately upon leaving school."). Based on how the House of Represent-
atives perceived educational loans, the court in Briscoe v. Bank of N. Y. (In re Briscoe),
1996] CASEBRIEF 1091
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tion that educational debt generally should not be dischargeable, the use
of the term "undue hardship" has generated considerable judicial analysis
in the nearly twenty years since section 523(a) (8) (B)'s enactment, primar-
ily due to the Bankruptcy Code's failure to define "undue hardship."
22
Courts have turned to section 523(a) (8) (B)'s statutory history for gui-
dance regarding what constitutes undue hardship. 23 Unfortunately, Con-
gress provided minimal guidance for the courts. 24 In fact, the report of
the compromise committee that was charged with combining the House
16 B.R. 128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), concluded that "the dischargeability of student
loans should be based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not simply a present
inability to fulfill financial commitment." Id. at 131.
22. Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 695. Dozens of cases exist in which
courts have conducted an examination of whether the debtor has shown that re-
payment of his or her educational debt will cause undue hardship. E.g., Penn-
sylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2532 (1996); Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assist-
ance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
731 (1995); Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993); Brunner v. New
York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam);
Ammirati v. Nellie Mae, Inc. (In reAmmirati), 187 B.R. 902 (D.S.C. 1995); Kraft v.
New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Kraft), 161 B.R. 82 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1993); Ipsen v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Ipsen), 149 B.R.
583 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Boston v. Utah Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re
Boston), 119 B.R. 162 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990); Reilly v. United Student Aid
Funds, Inc. (In re Reilly), 118 B.R. 38 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990); North Dakota State
Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Frech (In re Frech), 62 B.R. 235 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986);
Holzer v. Wachovia Servs., Inc. (In re Holzer), 33 B.R. 627 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Lezer v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Lezer), 21 B.R. 783
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982); Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Kammerud (In re Kam-
merud), 15 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). The Bankruptcy Code does not de-
fine the term "undue hardship," and thus has placed a significant burden on the
courts to determine exactly what constitutes "undue hardship" for purposes of ed-
ucational debt dischargeability. Collins, supra note 1, at 735 & n.16 (citing Conner
v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n (In re Conner), 89 B.R. 744, 747 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1988); Courtney v. Gainer Bank (In re Courtney), 79 B.R. 1004, 1010 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1987); Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bry-
ant), 72 B.R. 913, 914 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)); see also Dunham & Buch, supra note
1, at 695 (stating that "[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not define ['undue hardship'],
and the courts have not agreed upon a set definition"). As a result of the lack of
judicial agreement regarding what constitutes undue hardship, courts have devel-
oped several different standards for making such a determination. Id. For a dis-
cussion of the three most prominent tests that have developed since the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act-the Johnson test, the Bryant test and the Brunner test-see
infra notes 33-103 and accompanying text.
23. E.g., Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135-36; Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re
Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 1992); Brunner v. New York State Higher
Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 753-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 831
F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
24. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 753. When Congress drafted section 523(a), the initial
version of the House bill made no reference to student loans, whereas the Senate's
bill closely resembled the final language of section 523(a) (8). Id. The Senate re-
port that accompanied the bill, however, did not mention undue hardship, essen-
tially permitting discharge of student loans once they had been due and owing for
at least five years. Id. at 754.
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and Senate positions into one bill made no mention of undue hardship.2 5
Rather, the term "undue hardship" had its origin in a draft bill proposed
by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States ("Com-
mission"). 2 6 In its report, the Commission stated that the undue hardship
provision was included to combat the "'rising incidence of consumer
bankruptcies of former students motivated primarily to avoid payment of
educational loan debts."' 27 Regarding a framework for determining un-
due hardship, the Commission "envisioned a determination of whether
the amount and reliability of income and other wealth which the debtor
could reasonably be expected to receive in the future could maintain the
debtor and his or her dependents at a minimal standard of living as well as
pay off the student loans."'28
25. Id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. H11096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978), reprinted in,
COLL.IER ON BANKRUPTCY, app. 3 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1979), at IX-101).
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 140 n.14 (1973)). This 1973 report
of the Commission indicated the policy that "'a loan ... that enables a person to
earn substantially greater income over his working life should not as a matter of
policy be dischargeable before he has demonstrated that for any reason he is un-
able to earn sufficient income to maintain himself and his dependents and to re-
pay the educational debt."' Id. (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 140 n.15). In
essence, the test promulgated by the Commission would measure the debtor's
present or future ability to repay the debt. Wiese, supra note 2, at 448. One com-
mentator noted:
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt will im-
pose an "undue hardship" on the debtor, the rate and amount of his
future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of ability to ob-
tain, retain, and continue employment and the rate of pay that can be
expected. Any unearned income or other wealth which the debtor can
be expected to receive should also be taken into account. The total
amount of income, its reliability, and the periodicity of its receipt should
be adequate to maintain the debtor and his dependents at a minimal
standard of living within their management capacity, as well as to pay the
educational debt.
2 BANKRUPTCY REFORM AcT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 140-41 n.17 (Alan
Resnick & Eugene M. Wypyski eds., 1979).
28. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 754 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 140-41 n.17).
Along with determining the debtor's present or future ability to repay the debt,
the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States ("Bankrupcy
Commission Report") would require that such an inability to repay the debt not be
self-imposed, a concept that has been recognized by courts that have addressed the
issue of undue hardship. Wiese, supra note 2, at 448-49 & n.28 (citing Price v.
United States (In re Price), 1 B.R. 768 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980) (stating that dis-
charge is inappropriate where debtor was paying $2,700 a year for child's private
school tuition)). In Andrews University v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738
(6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit stated:
The legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) teaches us that the exclu-
sion of educational loans from the discharge provisions was designed to
remedy an abuse by students who, immediately upon graduation, filed
petition for bankruptcy and obtained a discharge of their educational
loans. This was due to the fact that unlike commercial transactions where
credit is extended based on the debtor's collateral, income, and credit
rating, student loans are generally unsecured and based solely upon the
7
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Not surprisingly, the ambiguity surrounding "undue hardship" as
used within the Bankruptcy Code and the legislative history of section
523(a) (8) (B) has left the courts with the difficult task of developing an
appropriate standard for determining when educational debt should be
dischargeable. 29 As a result, courts have adopted several different tests,
generating a lack of uniformity among the nation's judiciary.30 Addition-
belief that the student-debtor will have sufficient income to service the
debt following graduation.
Id. at 740.
29. Collins, supra note 1, at 735.
30. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72
F.3d 298, 299-300 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2532 (1996). Some
courts have stated that discharge of educational debt will be permitted if the
debtor can establish that repayment of the loans will cause his or her standard of
living to fall below a "minimal" level. E.g., Andrews v. South Dakota Student Loan
Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981); Pennsylvania
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 532, 537 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979). Other courts have required the debtor to
show that the debtor's current inability to repay the loans will extend well into the
foreseeable future. E.g., Moorman v. Kentucky Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In
re Moorman), 44 B.R. 135, 137 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984); Reid v. First Tenn. Bank
(In re Reid), 39 B.R. 24, 26 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); Love v. United States (In re
Love), 33 B.R. 753, 755 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); Holzer v. Wachovia Servs., Inc. (In
re Holzer), 33 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re
Briscoe), 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). Some courts have required
debtors to show unique or exceptional circumstances requiring discharge of the
loans. E.g., Rappaport v. Orange Sav. Bank (In re Rappaport), 16 B.R. 615, 617
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1981); Densmore v. Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. (In re
Densmore), 8 B.R. 308, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979). Such unique or exceptional
circumstances may be illness, lack of usable job skills, the existence of a large
number of dependents or a combination thereof. See Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 (cit-
ing numerous cases in which unique or exceptional circumstances have been
found to apply and justify discharge of student loans). Many courts have required,
as part of a "good faith" prong analysis, that the debtor show that he or she made
good faith efforts to repay the loans and that repayment is impossible due to cir-
cumstances beyond his or her control. Rappaport, 16 B.R. at 617; Wisconsin Higher
Educ. Aid Bd. v. MacPherson (In re MacPherson), 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 950
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1978). As part of a "good faith" prong analysis, some courts
have allowed debtors to discharge their loans if they can establish that the educa-
tion they received with those loans has provided them with little or no economic
benefit. E.g., Connolly v. Florida Bd. of Regents (In re Connolly), 29 B.R. 978, 982
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (finding that possibility of 57 year-old debtor with numer-
ous physical and emotional health problems deriving significant benefit from edu-
cation received was "extremely remote"); Powelson v. Stewart Sch. of Hairstyling
(In re Powelson), 25 B.R. 274, 276 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982) (holding that debtor who
received education in hairstyling did not increase job skills by any significant
amount); Littell v. Oregon (In re Littell), 6 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (find-
ing that debt was fully dischargeable where debtor had received education in field
that was overloaded and did not provide many job opportunities). Some courts
have applied what has been called the "ability to pay test," which often focuses on
different aspects of the debtor's ability to repay the debt. See, e.g., Cahill v. Norstar
Bank of Upstate N.Y. (In re Cahill), 93 B.R. 8, 12 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 1988) (examin-
ing ability to repay debt after other bills had been paid each month); Lisanti v.
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In reLisanti), 77 B.R. 27, 28 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1987) (examining debtor's ability to maintain minimum standard of liv-
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ally, although numerous tests have been suggested and implemented by
lower courts, the circuit courts have remained overwhelmingly silent on
the matter, leaving the decision of which test to use to the discretion of
those lower courts.31 Among the many tests that have been developed,
ing if forced to repay loans); Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (examining debtor's
income in relation to federal poverty guidelines); Ballard v. Virginia ex rel. State
Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Ballard), 60 B.R. 673, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986)
(requiring certainty of hopelessness, rather than just inability to pay, in order to
determine whether there is undue hardship); Connecticut Student Loan Found. v.
Keenan (In reKeenan), 53 B.R. 913, 918 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (adopting unique
and extraordinary circumstances test regarding debtor's present ability to repay
debt); see also Ted D. Ayres & Dianne R. Sagner, The Bankruptcy Reform Act and
Student Loans: Unraveling New Knots, 9 J.C. & U.L. 361, 367-80 (1983) (discussing
undue hardship and surveying different tests applied by various courts to make
undue hardship evaluations); Janice E. Kosel, Running the Gauntlet of "Undue Hard-
ship "--The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 457,
466-78 (1981) (same). Finally, some courts have decided to reject tests that focus
on a particular factor or set of factors, choosing instead to subscribe to a "totality of
the circumstances" test. E.g., Mayes v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ.
(In re Mayes), 183 B.R. 261, 264 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995) (stating that such factors
may include examination of circumstances at time of case and circumstances
thereafter, as well as examination of debtor's health and ability to find job and
whether debtor's annual cash receipts fall below poverty guideline); Claxton v.
Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n (In re Claxton), 140 B.R. 565, 568-69 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1992) (stating that poverty guideline test is suggestive, but not conclusive); John-
son v. USA Funds, Inc. (In reJohnson), 121 B.R. 91, 94 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)
(examining circumstances at time of commencement of case and circumstances
thereafter); Simons v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Simons), 119 B.R.
589, 593 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Coleman v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In
re Coleman), 98 B.R. 443, 451 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989); Clay v. Westmar College (In
re Clay), 12 B.R. 251, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981) (looking at totality of circum-
stances but focusing primarily on lifestyle and educational background of debtor).
The above examples illustrate the confusion and haphazardness of undue hard-
ship analysis throughout the nation's courts. See Collins, supra note 1, at 747 (stat-
ing that existence of these numerous tests that are often hard to apply and
understand is "suspect"); see also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (discussing problems associated with various multi-factored tests). Still, the
development of the Brunner test has had an impressive effect on undue hardship
analysis, as numerous jurisdictions have adopted the Brunner test to determine
whether the debtor has established that repayment of his or her loan would cause
undue hardship. See Elebrashy v. Student Loan Corp. (In re Elebrashy), 189 B.R.
922, 925-26 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (listing numerous cases decided since 1991
in which courts have adopted Brunner standard). For a discussion of the Brunner
test and cases in which courts have applied the Brunner standard, see infra notes 79-
103 and accompanying text.
31. See Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395,
396 (per curiam) (stating that before it adopted standard developed by district
court in prior proceeding of same case, there was "very little appellate authority on
the definition of 'undue hardship' in the context of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (8) (B)").
Essentially, only the Second, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have considered the stan-
dard a court should apply to determine whether undue hardship exists, and those
circuits have applied the Brunner test. See Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assist-
ance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Brunner
test, although not adopting it as controlling in Sixth Circuit), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
731 (1995); Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993) (adopting
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three have received the greatest degree of support: the Johnson test, the
Bryant test and the Brunner test.
32
A. The Johnson Tripartite Test
Shortly after the ratification of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania announced a
tripartite test to determine whether repayment of educational debt would
impose undue hardship on a Chapter 7 debtor in Pennsylvania Higher Edu-
cation Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson).3 3 In Johnson, the court
divided its undue hardship analysis into three separate tests: "mechanical,"
"good faith" and "policy."3 4
1. The "Mechanical" Test
In conducting the "mechanical" prong of its undue hardship inquiry,
the Johnson court focused on the debtor's future.3 5 The court asked
whether "the debtor's future financial resources for the longest foresee-
able period of time allowed for repayment of the loan [will] be sufficient
to support the debtor and his dependent(s) at a subsistence or poverty
standard of living, as well as to fund repayment of the student loan."
36 If
the court determines, under this prong of the test, that the debtor's future
financial resources are sufficient to support him or herself and any depen-
dents at a subsistence level while repaying the loan, then the debt will not
be discharged.3 7 Alternatively, if the court finds that the debtor cannot
support him or herself while repaying the loan, the court will move on to
the "good faith" test.3 8
Brunner test); Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (citing Brunner, 46 B.R. at 752 (adopting
standard developed by district court as controlling within Second Circuit)).
32. Faish, 72 F.3d at 303. For a discussion of the Johnson test and cases in
which courts chose to use the Johnson test, see infra notes 33-64 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Bryant test and cases in which courts chose to apply
the Byant test, see infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the Brunner test and the cases in which courts have applied the Brunner test, see
infra notes 79-103 and accompanying text.
33. 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 532, 544 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
34. Id. at 539-44. For a discussion of these three prongs of the Johnson test, see
infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
35. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 537-39. The analysis under the
"mechanical" test examines, specifically, the debtor's future resources and future
expenses in determining whether repayment of the educational debt is feasible.
Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 696.
36. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 544.
37. Id.
38. Id. Although the debtor may be able to satisfy the "mechanical" prong of
the Johnson test, the debt will not be discharged if the debtor has failed to make a
good faith effort to repay the loan. Id. at 540 (citing Alan Ahart, Discharging Stu-
dent Loans in Bankruptcy, 52 Am. BANKRu. LJ. 201, 207 (1978)). For a discussion of
the Johnson "good faith" test, see infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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To establish the debtor's potential future resources under the
"mechanical" test, the court may take into account such factors as rate of
pay, wages, skills, sex, ability to obtain and retain employment, education,
health, access to transportation and whether the debtor has to provide for
small children.3 9 Additionally, to determine the debtor's future expenses,
the court must ascertain "what amount of monthly expenses is reasonable
for a 'similarly situated hypothetical debtor"' and must add to that figure
any "extraordinary expenses" the debtor must pay.40 Because educational
loans typically are repaid over a ten year period, the debtor is generally
required to show that his or her financial position "will not foreseeably
improve over the next ten (10) years or so."4 1
2. The "Good Faith" Test
If the "mechanical" test is satisfied, then the court moves to the "good
faith" test to determine whether the debtor has made a good faith attempt
to pay the debt.42 Accordingly, the "good faith" test examines whether the
debtor has "willfully or negligently immers[ed] himself in debt," sug-
gesting that a debtor's educational loans will not be discharged unless the
circumstances causing the debtor's financial predicament are beyond his
or her control. 43
39. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 537-38. The Johnson court stated that
to determine future financial resources, a court should consider earned income
resources like those mentioned above and other sources of income or wealth the
debtor may possess, such as welfare and child support. Id. at 538.
40. Id. at 538-39 (quoting Ahart, supra note 38, at 207). When examining the
reasonable expenses for a "similarly situated hypothetical debtor," a court should
examine the debtor's marital status, number of dependents and how necessities
are being supplied (whether in kind or at a reduced cost). Id. at 538. When exam-
ining a debtor's extraordinary expenses, a court is to take into account any nondis-
charged debts. Id. Additionally, unique medical expenses may be deemed to
constitute extraordinary expenses. Id. Extraordinary expenses are not to be con-
fused with excess expenditures, however, which are discretionary and not to be
considered when calculating a debtor's future expenses. Dunham & Buch, supra
note 1, at 697.
41. Burton v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Burton),
117 B.R. 167, 170 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (citing Bey v. Dollar Sav. Bank (In re
Bey), 95 B.R. 376, 378 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989)) (applying Johnson tripartite test).
In Craig v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Craig), 64 B.R. 854
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986), the bankruptcy court stated:
In analyzing whether the repayment of this loan will cause "undue hard-
ship," the Court recognizes that these educational loans are generally re-
paid over a long term-usually ten years. Therefore .... to discharge an
educational loan, the Debtor ... must ... show that her circumstances,
such as they were, could not foreseeably change for the better over the
next ten years.
Id. at 856-57.
42. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 544. Absent a good faith attempt to
repay the debt, the debtor will not have his or her debt discharged even where the
mechanical prong has been satisfied. Id. at 540.
43. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAwS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 140 n.14 (1973)). The Bankruptcy
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According to the Johnson court, when applying the "good faith" stan-
dard, a court is to ask two questions: "Was the debtor negligent or irre-
sponsible in his efforts to minimize expenses, maximize resources, or
secure employment?" and "If 'yes,' then would lack of such negligence or
irresponsibility have altered the answer to the mechanical test?" 44 If the
answer to the first part of the "good faith" test is "no," then the debtor's
obligation to repay the debt should be discharged. 45 If both parts of the
test are answered "yes," then a presumption against dischargeability arises
that the debtor may overcome only by satisfying the third test, the "policy"
test.
46
3. The "Policy" Test
Through the "policy" test, a court determines whether an attempt to
discharge educational debt by the particular debtor "constitutes the sort of
abuse which section 523(a) (8) (B) was enacted to prevent. '47 The "policy"
analysis is intended to focus on the debtor's motivation for filing the bank-
ruptcy petition, the amount of student loan debt and whether the debtor's
position was improved due to the education received. 48 According to the
Johnson court, the "policy" test asks:
Do the circumstances-i.e., the amount and percentage of total
indebtedness of the student loan and the employment prospects
of the petitioner indicate:
(a) That the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy petition
was to discharge the student debt, or
Commission Report implicitly endorsed the view that an educational loan is not dis-
chargeable if the debtor is the cause of his or her own continued financial woes:
The claimant must establish that the debtor can pay the educational debt
from future earnings or other wealth, such as trust fund income or an
inheritance. This requirement recognizes that in some circumstances the
debtor, because of factors beyond his reasonable control, may be unable
to earn an income adequate both to meet the living costs of himself and
his dependents and to make the educational debt payments.
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 140 n.16.
44. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 544.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Burton v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Burton),
117 B.R 167, 170 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (citing Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
at 542); see Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 699 (stating that Johnson court, in
establishing "policy" prong, focused on efforts to remedy abuse of bankruptcy laws
by examining amount of student loan debt, percentage of indebtedness, and bene-
fits received by debtor from his or her education).
48. Zibura v. Academic Fin. Servs. Ass'n (In re Zibura), 128 B.R. 129, 133
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (citing Albert v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Al-
bert), 25 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982)).
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(b) That the debtor has definitely benefitted financially
from the education which the loan helped to finance?4 9
The court in Johnson stated that if the answer to both parts of the
question is "no," the debt should be discharged.50 If the answer to either
part is "yes," however, the debt should not be discharged.5 1 This "policy"
prong is considered only if the debtor has not satisfied the "mechanical"
test.
5 2
Throughout the country, the Johnson test has received varying degrees
of support. For example, one bankruptcy court heralded the Johnson
tripartite test as "set[ting] forth a sequential procedure for analyzing the
facts of a given case."55 Although courts that have applied the Johnson
49. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 544. Bad faith by the debtor regard-
ing attempts to repay the loan may be rebutted by a showing that the debtor's
principal reason for filing a bankruptcy petition was not to eradicate substantial
student loans, and that he or she received little or no economic benefit from the
education financed by the loans at issue. Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In reBriscoe), 16
B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
50. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 544.
51. Id. According to Dunham and Buch's analysis of the "policy" test, even if
having the educational debt discharged was not the reason for filing bankruptcy,
policy should influence a court to deny discharge of the debt when the debtor has
received a clear benefit from his or her education. Dunham & Buch, supra note 1,
at 699.
52. Zibura, 128 B.R. at 133 (citing Erickson v. North Dakota State Univ. (In re
Erickson), 52 B.R. 154, 157 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985)). Considering the overall effect
of the tripartite test it had promulgated, the Johnson court stated:
[A] debtor should be denied discharge of his student loan within the
[seven] year period after the debt matures, if either:
(a) his future financial resources are most likely sufficient to fi-
nance repayment of the student loan, and to support the debtor
and his dependents at or above the poverty level, or,
(b) but for the debtor's negligence or irresponsibility, he would
be able to repay the loan without lowering his standard of living
below the poverty level.
A court should grant discharge of a student loan within [seven] years
after it becomes due, based on a finding that repayment of the loan
would cause the debtor "undue hardship," where:
(a) The debtor's future income and wealth, in the maximum
forseeable [sic] period allowed for repayment of the student
loan, are likely to be insufficient to fund the loan's repayment
and to support the debtor and his dependents at a subsistence
level of living, and
(b) either such hardship is due to circumstances beyond the
debtor's control; or,
(c) the circumstances clearly indicate that discharge of the stu-
dent loan was not a dominant reason for filing bankruptcy, and
that the debtor's earnings prospects have not appreciably
benefitted from his education.
Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 544-45.
53. Zibura, 128 B.R. at 132 (citing Erickson, 52 B.R. at 157). In Zibura, the
court applied the tripartite test and found that educational loans were not dis-
chargeable where the debtor, because of the distance of his job from his family
residence, maintained two residences, spoke to his family by long distance tele-
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tripartite test have concurred with the test's requirement that the "mech-
anical" prong and either the "good faith" or "policy" prong be satisfied to
permit dischargeability, 54 they have rarely had to consider the second or
third prongs of the test.55 Generally, courts that have applied the Johnson
test have determined whether discharge of educational debt is appropriate
based solely on examination of the "mechanical" test.56 In most instances,
these courts have found that the debt should not be discharged.5 7 Some
courts have chosen to accept the Johnson test but have added other factors
for a court to consider.5 8 One court determined that even where the John-
son test is applied, courts retain the discretion to discharge all or part of an
educational loan even if the individual prongs of the Johnson test have not
been met on their face.59
phone everyday and incurred transportation expenses when he visited his family
each weekend. Id. at 131. The court ruled that the debtor had not satisfied the
"mechanical" test because, though his current expenses exceeded his income,
there was "ample reason to believe that [the debtor's] future financial condition
[would] improve and that he [would] be able to pay his student loans without
undue hardship." Id. at 133. Additionally, the court conducted a good faith analy-
sis even though it was not required to do so under the rules of Johnson. Id. Con-
ducting its good faith analysis, the court in Zibura found that a large portion of the
debtor's expenses were incurred due to his decision to maintain two residences
and that the debtor's family had not made a "sincere" effort to maximize financial
resources (the debtor's wife was healthy but chose not to work). Id.
54. Silliman v. Nebraska Higher Educ. Loan Program (In re Silliman), 144
B.R. 748, 751 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); Bakkum v. Great Lakes Higher Educ.
Corp. (In re Bakkum), 139 B.R. 680, 680 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); Zibura, 128 B.R.
at 132-33; Foreman v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Foreman), 119 B.R.
584, 587 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Boston v. Utah Higher Educ. Assistance Auth.
(In re Boston), 119 B.R. 162, 165-66 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990); Burton v. Penn-
sylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Burton), 117 B.R. 167, 169 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1990); North Dakota State Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Frech (In re Frech), 62
B.R_ 235, 240 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); Erickson, 52 B.R. at 157; Holzer v. Wachovia
Servs., Inc. (In re Holzer), 33 B.R. 627, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Albert v. Ohio
Student Loan Comm'n (In re Albert), 25 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982);
Lezer v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Lezer), 21 B.R. 783, 788-
89 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982); Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Kammerud (In reKam-
merud), 15 B.R. 1, 9-11 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
55. Wiese, supra note 2, at 449 (citing Lezer, 21 B.R. at 789-90; Briscoe v. Bank
of N.Y. (In re Briscoe), 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
56. Id.
57. E.g., Zibura, 128 B.R. at 133; Burton, 117 B.R. at 170; Craig v. Pennsylvania
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Craig), 64 B.R. 854, 856-57 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1986).
58. See, e.g., Love v. United States (In re Love), 28 B.R. 475, 478 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 1983) (adding to Johnson test factors such as: (1) length of time elapsed be-
tween graduation and date of bankruptcy filing and (2) amount of debt paid off by
debtor before he or she filed for bankruptcy).
59. Woyame v. Career Educ. & Management (In re Woyame), 161 B.R. 198,
203 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993). In Woyame, the debtor was unable to satisfy any of
the prongs of the Johnson test. Id. at 201-02. The debtor received decent income as
a truck driver, had excellent training in the field of heating and air conditioning
repair and had no wife or children. Id. at 201. Therefore, he was unable to satisfy
the "mechanical" test. Id. Further, because the debtor had made only minimal
1100
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Additionally, the Johnson test has been the subject of considerable crit-
icism, mainly from courts that have chosen to apply the Brunner test.60 In
Ammirati v. Nellie Mae, Inc. (In re Ammirati),6 1 for example, the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina criticized the John-
son test as imposing a policy test that is "overly complex."62 The Ammirati
court strongly disapproved of the requirement in Johnson that a court con-
sider the debtor's motives for filing a bankruptcy petition and whether the
debtor benefitted from the education he or she received with the loan.6 3
According to the court in Ammirati, "[dietermining the value of an educa-
tion is both subjective and inappropriate. The debtor is not entitled to an
efforts to cut back on his living expenses, the court found that he had not satisfied
the "good faith" prong of Johnson. Id. at 202. The debtor also failed the "policy"
prong of Johnson because he had apparently filed for bankruptcy for the dominant
purpose of avoiding repayment of his educational loans. Id. at 203. Nevertheless,
the Woyame court decided to discharge over $2,000 worth of the debtor's $11,000
in loans because testimony supported a finding that full repayment would tend to
work an undue hardship on the debtor. Id. The court stated that it may, in its
discretion, find that equity supports reduction of nondischargeable debt to a level
that removes the undue hardship from the debtor, given the debtor's income and
obligations, as well as consider steps the court believes the debtor could take to
improve his financial condition. Id.
60. See, e.g., Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
that policy prong of Johnson, which focuses on whether debtor has benefitted fi-
nancially from education received, conflicts with purpose of government-backed
student loan program); Virginia State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Dillon, 189 B.R.
382, 384 (W.D. Va. 1995) (adopting reasoning stated in Roberson); Hawkins v.
Buena Vista College (In re Hawkins), 187 B.R. 294, 298 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995)
(same).
61. 187 B.R. 902 (D.S.C. 1995).
62. Id. at 905. In Ammirati, the court began its analysis by stating that the
Fourth Circuit had yet to formally adopt a standard for determining undue hard-
ship. Id. The court determined that Brunner provided the appropriate standard to
measure the existence of undue hardship because it presented a clear test, was
supported by legislative history and had been applied in a significant number of
cases within the circuit. Id. (citing Dillon, 189 B.RI at 384; Walcott v. USA Funds,
Inc. (In re Walcott), 185 B.R. 721, 724 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995)). The court also
noted that the national trend has been toward adoption of the Brunner standard.
Id. at 905-06 (citing Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135; Stebbins-Hopf v. Texas Guaranteed
Student Loan Corp. (In re Stebbins-Hopf), 176 B.R. 784 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994);
Lynn v. Diversified Collection Serv. (In re Lynn), 168 B.R. 693 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1994); Healey v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. (In re Healey), 161 B.R. 389, 393
(E.D. Mich. 1993) (adopting Brunner and stating that Brunner has been adopted by
courts within the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits)).
63. Id. at 905 (citing Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands),
166 B.R. 299, 306 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994) (stating that Johnson is "hideously
complicated")). The Ammirati court found to be without merit Johnson's require-
ment that a reviewing court "ask whether the percentage of the student loan to
total indebtedness, when considered in combination with the employment pros-
pects of Debtor, indicates either that the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy
proceeding was to discharge the student debt or that the debtor definitely benefit-
ted from the education that the loan helped to finance." Id. (citing Pennsylvania
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In reJohnson), 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 532, 544 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979)).
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undue-hardship discharge by virtue of selecting an education that failed to
return economic rewards."'64
B. The Bryant Poverty Level Test
Although the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania promulgated the Johnson tripartite test, that same court explicitly
rejected the Johnson test in Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency (In re Bryant).6 5 The court in Bryant, expressing its dissatisfaction
with the "policy" prong of the Johnson test, characterized the tripartite test
as "unfortunately complicated. '66 The test promulgated by the court in
Bryant became known as the "poverty level" test because the determination
of whether repayment of an educational debt would result in undue hard-
ship on the debtor hinged on the debtor's income level in relation to fed-
eral poverty guidelines established by the United States Bureau of
Census.6 7 The Bryant court stated:
We propose, as a starting position, to analyze the income and
resources of the debtor and his dependents in relation to federal
poverty guidelines ... and determine dischargeability of the stu-
dent loan obligation on the basis of whether the debtor's income
is substantially over the amounts set forth in those guidelines or
not. If not, a discharge will result only if the debtor can establish
"unique" and "extraordinary" circumstances which should never-
theless render the debt dischargeable. If the debtor's income is
below or close to the guideline, the lender can prevail only by
establishing that circumstances exist which render these guide-
lines unrealistic, such as the debtor's failure to maximize his re-
64. Id. (citing Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1137).
65. 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). Bryant involved the bankruptcy peti-
tions of three debtors seeking to have their educational loans discharged. Id. The
court began its analysis of undue hardship by examining the applicable legislative
history, and found that because the Bankruptcy Code did not define "undue hard-
ship," courts had applied various tests, none of which provided simple objective
standards by which to measure undue hardship. Id. at 914-15.
66. Id. at 915 n.2. The court in Bryant stated that the Johnson test's compli-
cated nature encouraged it to attempt to develop an objective, simple test. Id.
The Bryant court focused primarily on the "policy" prong of Johnson, and stated
that consideration of whether the debtor's dominant purpose for filing for bank-
ruptcy was to avoid repayment of student loans was wholly inappropriate. Id. Ac-
cording to the court, avoidance of the consequences of debt is typically the reason
for filing for bankruptcy, and as such, should be irrelevant to a court's undue
hardship analysis. Id. (citing In re Gathright, 67 B.R. 384, 391 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1986)).
67. See id. at 915-16 (describing workings of its newly developed test). For a
discussion of the workings of the Bryant "poverty level" test, see infra note 68 and
accompanying text.
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sources or clear prospects of the debtor for future income
increases. 68
In arriving at this standard, the Bryant court stated that the test comported
with the purpose of section 523(a) (8) (B) as indicated in the Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.69 The Bryant court
stated that this report represented the congressional intention "that debt-
ors who [are] not able to maintain a minimal standard of living should be
discharged of their student loan obligations, per 523(a) (8) (B)." '70
Distinguishing its analysis from the tripartite test promulgated in John-
son, the court in Bryant stated:
[O]nly if a debtor's income is significantly greater than the
poverty guideline, would it become necessary to evaluate the myr-
iad of factors and circumstances, which courts presently examine,
to determine whether the debtor's situation manifests such
68. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915. The court revealed its hope that its test would
provide courts with a more objective standard than that provided by Johnson for
determining whether a debtor has established undue hardship. Id. This "poverty
level" test, however, does appear to establish a per se hardship finding when the
debtor's income is below the federal poverty guidelines. Dunham & Buch, supra
note 1, at 701. The court in Bryant did, however, state that lenders have the right
to show unique or extraordinary circumstances that would render nondischarge-
able the debt of an individual whose income falls near or below the poverty guide-
lines. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 919. Because the court assumed that debtors will attempt
to maximize their resources in an attempt to live above the poverty line, it will be
hard for a creditor to establish the existence of such special circumstances warrant-
ing nondischargeability of educational debt where an individual lives below the
poverty guidelines. Id.
69. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915 (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANK-
RUPrCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 141 (1973)).
70. Id. The court quoted a portion from the Bankruptcy Commission Report
which stated that undue hardship can be determined through examination of the
debtor's estimated future resources, measured in terms of the debtor's ability to
obtain and retain employment and in terms of the wages received from such em-
ployment. Id. The Commission, in its report, explicitly stated that "[t]he total
amount of income, its reliability, and the periodicity of its receipt should be ade-
quate to maintain the debtor and his dependents at a minimal standard of living
within their management capacity, as well as to pay the educational debt." H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, at 140-41. The court in Bryant perceived this language to indi-
cate an intent to base undue hardship on whether the debtor could make pay-
ments while maintaining a minimal standard of living in accordance with federally
determined poverty guidelines. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915.
Additionally, the court emphasized that in determining where the debtor's
income fit within the federal poverty guidelines, net income, rather than gross
income, was to be examined. Id. at 916 & n.4. Such federal poverty guidelines are
commonly used to determine an individual's eligibility for various federal assist-
ance programs. Id. at 916. The court reasoned that such income levels are viewed
by the federal government as bare subsistance levels used by the government to
find that individuals are incapable of paying for necessary services. Id. Based on
how the government applies the poverty levels, the court found that such levels
could also be used to determine the debtor's ability or inability to repay educa-
tional loans. Id.
1996] CASEBRIEF 1103
17
Marsh: Bankruptcy Law - Discharging Student Loans under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
"unique" or "extraordinary" circumstances as to allow discharge
of a governmentally-guaranteed student loan debt on the basis of
undue hardship. 71
The court stated that this objective-based test was aimed at minimizing
moral judgments by courts concerning the propriety of certain expendi-
tures made by debtors. 72
71. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 917. The court stated, however, that even if the debtor's
net income fell close to the poverty guideline, discharge might still be justified. Id.
Furthermore, even if the debtor's income was not at or near the federal poverty
guideline, educational debt could be discharged if unique or extraordinary cir-
cumstances were present that would render such a financial burden on the debtor
that his or her ability to repay the debt would be quite unlikely. Id. The court
noted, however, that those circumstances rendering repayment unlikely must be
more than merely unpleasant. Id. "The existence of the adjective 'undue' indi-
cates that Congress viewed garden-variety hardship as insufficient to warrant the
discharge of a student loan." Id. (citing Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ.
Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 831 F.2d 395
(2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). One court noted that financial adversity alone is not
enough to constitute undue hardship-rather, severe economic disadvantage
caused by unique sets of circumstances rendering the possibility of repayment non-
existent is required for a finding of undue hardship. Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re
Briscoe), 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing New York State Higher
Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Kohn (In re Kohn), 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 419, 424 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1979)). The Bryant court did recognize that there are varying gradations
of unique or extraordinary circumstances and that the determination of whether
such circumstances constitute undue hardship depends upon the magnitude by
which the debtor's income exceeds the relevant poverty guideline. Bryant, 72 B.R.
at 917. For example, "a less extraordinary circumstance would justify a discharge
of a debtor whose income is slightly over the guidelines, while a very significant
circumstance would be necessary to serve a debtor whose income is comfortably
over the guidelines." Id. The court emphasized that it only looks to the existence
of unique or extraordinary circumstances if the test of income in relation to the
federal poverty guidelines is not met by the debtor. Id. at 918. If a court is forced
to examine special circumstances, relevant factors for a court to consider include
the debtor's living expenses and whether such expenses are reasonable. Id. (citing
Andrews v. South Dakota Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In reAndrews), 661 F.2d
702 (8th Cir. 1981)). Types of expenses that would constitute unique or extraordi-
nary expenses include those arising from physical or mental illness and/or unu-
sual responsibilities relating to the needs of dependents. Id. Additionally, a court
may examine the debtor's employment history and/or prospects for future de-
crease of income to uncover the existence of special circumstances that would jus-
tify discharge of the debt. Id.
72. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 918. The test assumes that debtors will attempt to maxi-
mize their ability to improve their lives and improve their income while spending
their money in ways that further their best interests. Id. The court observed: "We
find ourselves in disagreement with those courts which have denied discharges of
student loans on the basis of whether any given expenses are justified, as these
represent subjective value judgments concerning which we consider ourselves no
better able to gauge than, generally, debtors themselves." Id. (citing Massachusetts
Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Packer (In re Packer), 9 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1981); New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Brock (In re Brock), 4 B.R. 491
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); Price v. United States (In re Price), 1 B.R. 768 (Bankr. D.
Haw. 1980)). Additionally, the court expressed its dissatisfaction with opinions
that focused on whether the education received through the student loan actually
benefitted the debtor. Id. (citing Littell v. Oregon ex rel. State Bd. of Higher Educ.
1104 [Vol. 41: p. 1087
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss4/6
1996] CASEBRIEF 1105
Applying the test it had just announced, the court in Bryant dis-
charged the student loans in two Chapter 7 cases finding the existence of
undue hardship, while denying discharge in a third case.73 The court de-
nied discharge of the student loan obligations owed by a debtor whose
income was significantly higher than the 1987 federal poverty guideline
because the debtor was unable to establish "unique" or "extraordinary"
circumstances to justify discharge of the debt.7 4 In the two cases in which
discharge was granted, the debtors' annual gross income either fell below
the poverty guideline or was approximately consistent with the
guideline.
75
(In re Littell), 6 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (stating that courts should ex-
amine whether debtor's acceptance of loan in order to receive education was eco-
nomically sound decision by debtor for purposes of discharge of debt)). But see
Motor v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Motor), 64 B.R. 317, 318 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that receipt of education opens doors unavailable to those
without college degrees and that discharge should be denied unless debtor estab-
lishes "uniquely devastating hardship"). The Bryant court emphasized that the
purpose of educational loans is to provide students with the means to improve
their intellectual skills and their chances of achieving success, not to guarantee
ultimate success. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 919 (citing Fitzgerald v. Pennsylvania Higher
Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Fitzgerald), 40 B.R. 528, 529-30 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984)). Specifically, the Bryant court stated that the debtor's "use" of the educa-
tion received via the educational loans is to be considered by a court only to aid in
determination of the debtor's income, and nothing more. Id.
73. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 919-26. For a discussion regarding the reasons behind
the Bryant court's ruling, see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
74. Bryant, 72 B.R. at 922. The debtor had various skills, was only 23 years-old,
had no dependents and lived with his self-sufficient father. Id. at 921-22. The
debtor had made no payments on his student loans and stated that his current
wages exceeded his monthly expenditures by only ten dollars. Id. at 922. The
court found that no unique or extraordinary circumstances existed warranting dis-
charge of the debtor's loans, especially since the lender was willing to set up a
payment plan with the debtor whereby the debtor would make monthly payments
on his loan of thirty dollars. Id. at 922-23.
75. Id. at 919-21, 925-27. The debtor whose income was significantly below
the federal poverty guideline was a young woman with no dependents, who had no
prospects for full-time employment at more than minimum wage because she
lacked experience necessary for all of the previous jobs she had sought. Id. at 920.
This debtor lived alone in a one room apartment, owned no furniture, owned no
car and had not received complete training from the community college she had
attended. Id. The court stated that the facts of this case underscored the propriety
of the test it had developed in allowing a court to make a quick decision in such a
clear-cut case. Id. at 921.
In the case of the debtor whose income mirrored the poverty guideline, the
court determined that discharge was justified because the debtor did not have
steady employment (he was a substitute teacher whose monthly income fluctuated
based on school holidays, vacations, etc.) and because of unique circumstances
such as costs for insulin to control diabetes and expenses incurred for his special
dietary needs. Id. at 926. By factoring such extraordinary costs into a situation
where the debtor's income already placed him at the poverty line, the court found
that the debtor essentially lived below the poverty guideline, warranting discharge
of his educational debt. Id. at 926-27.
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The Bryant test has received only limited acceptance. In Reilly v.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Reilly), 76 one of the few cases to accept
the Bryant standard, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland was
presented with a fact pattern that fit perfectly within the Bryant standard
for finding undue hardship-the debtor's gross income was just barely
above the federal poverty guideline, her former husband was terminally ill,
she had three children to raise, her home had been lost to foreclosure and
the family incurred a deficit of approximately $600 per month.77 Beyond
the holding in Reilly, however, bankruptcy courts generally have been re-
luctant to subscribe to a standard that focuses primarily on the debtor's
status in relation to federal poverty-level guidelines. 78
76. 118 B.R. 38 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
77. Id. at 41. The circumstances the debtor faced outweighed the fact that
she had not attempted to make a single payment on her educational loan of
$2,762. Id. The court also determined that the debtor was not in a position to
improve her situation because she was 24 credits away from receiving her degree.
Id. The court stated that it adopted the Bryant standard because it was more objec-
tive than Brunner, while still providing a court with the flexibility to consider
unique or extraordinary circumstances if necessary. Id. at 40-41. For a discussion
of the court's holding in Brunner, see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
78. Cf Reyes v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ. (In re Reyes), 154
B.R. 320 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1993) (involving acceptance of Bryant standard by
Bankruptcy Court for Eastern District of Oklahoma). In Reyes, the Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma adopted the Bryant test and found that
the debtors' educational loans were not dischargeable. Id. at 323-24. The debtors'
wages in Reyes were well above the federal poverty guidelines. Id. at 324. Applying
the Bryant test, the court in Reyes chose to adopt a gross income test rather than a
net income test as prescribed in Bryant. Id. at 323. Although the debtors cared for
an ill, dependent child, they were unable to show that such illness presented a
significant financial burden to constitute a unique or extraordinary circumstance.
Id. at 324. The only financial impact presented by the debtors was evidence of a
monthly prescription expense of $75. Id. The Reyes court rejected the Brunner test,
finding that the legislative history of section 523(a) (8) (B) supported the Bryant
test. Id. at 323-24. Additionally, the court ruled that the Bryant test provided an
objective approach to determining undue hardship that would not create different
results regarding similarly situated debtors located in different jurisdictions. Id.
The court found that the Bryant test most closely comported with the Bankruptcy
Code's goal of providing unfortunate debtors with an opportunity to make a fresh
start. Id. at 323. Further, the court noted that the Bryant poverty level test re-
flected the drafter's intent of the Bankruptcy Commission Report, in which "un-
due hardship" was defined in terms of a debtor's ability to maintain a "minimal
standard of living." Id. The court believed that adoption of the Bryant test would
provide an element of predictability to such litigation, allowing debtors to deter-
mine, even before litigation had commenced, their probability of obtaining dis-
charge of their educational loans. Id.
Such support for the Bryant test, however, was short-lived. In Mayes v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education (In re Mayes), 183 B.R. 261 (Bankr. E.D.
Okla. 1995), the same court rejected the Bryant test, choosing instead to follow
bankruptcy courts in other parts of Oklahoma that had declined to adhere to any
particular test. Id. at 264 (citing Claxton v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n (In re Clax-
ton), 140 B.R. 565 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992); Johnson v. USA Funds, Inc. (In re
Johnson), 121 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)). The Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, in the above cases, looked at the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether discharge of educational loans would be justi-
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C. The Brunner Test
In recent years, the Brunner test has easily received the most support,
and has been lauded as providing the most appropriate standard for deter-
mining whether repayment of educational debt would impose an undue
hardship on the debtor and his or her dependents. 79 Although little ap-
pellate authority exists regarding the proper definition of "undue hard-
fled. Claxton, 140 B.R. at 569; Johnson, 121 B.R. at 93-94. The Claxton court would
examine, for example, the circumstances at the time the case is commenced and
circumstances thereafter. Claxton, 140 B.R. at 569. In addition, the Claxton court
stated that it would consider the "poverty level" test, but that such a test would not
be conclusive of whether discharge would be permitted or denied. Id.
Based on its examination of the cases from the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, the Mayes court determined that a "totality of the
circumstances" test, in which numerous factors would be examined based on the
facts of a particular case, would most adequately prevent the federal student loan
program from being abused. Mayes, 183 B.R. at 264. The court stated that an
additional factor to consider is "whether the Debtor's annual cash receipts are less
than the poverty guideline," thereby incorporating the Bryant test as a factor to
consider during undue hardship analysis. Id. A court can consider other factors,
such as the level of the debtor's education, the debtor's expenses for rent, the
debtor's health, the debtor's employment (including whether it has been steady)
and the debtor's ability to adjust and find jobs easily. Id. While noting that dis-
charge of educational debt should be reserved for rare circumstances, the court
stated that a court, using the "totality of the circumstances" test, could "modify the
amount owed on the student loan or revise the payment terms." Id. (citing Albert
v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Albert), 25 B.R. 98, 102 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1982)). One court had determined that although the principal of an educational
loan was not dischargeable, interest and attorney fees were dischargeable. Id. (cit-
ing Ballard v. Virginia ex rel. State Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Ballard), 60 B.R.
673, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986)). Based on its research, the Mayes court deter-
mined that it was appropriate to discharge the debtor's accrued interest and attor-
ney fees. Id. Additionally, the court modified the monthly payment the debtor
was required to make to his lender. Id.
79. See Coveney v. Costep Servicing Agent (In re Coveney), 192 B.R. 140, 142
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (applying Brunner test and noting that although Fifth
Circuit has not formally adopted undue hardship standard, trend is toward adopt-
ing Brunnerstandard); Virginia State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Dillon, 189 B.R. 382,
384 (W.D. Va. 1995) (employing Brunner standard); Cobb v. University of Toledo
(In re Cobb), 188 B.R. 22, 23 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (same); Ammirati v. Nellie
Mae, Inc. (In reAmmirati), 187 B.R. 902, 904 (D.S.C. 1995) (same); Hawkins v.
Buena Vista College (In re Hawkins), 187 B.R. 294, 298 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (same);
Garrett v. New Hampshire Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Garrett), 180 B.R.
358, 362 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (same); Stebbins-Hopf v. Texas Guaranteed Stu-
dent Loan Corp. (In re Stebbins-Hopf), 176 B.R 784, 786 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994)
(same); McLeod v. Diversified Collection Serv. (In re McLeod), 176 B.R. 455, 457
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (same); Daugherty v. First Tenn. Bank (In re Daugherty),
175 B.R. 953, 958 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994) (same); Lynn v. Diversified Collection
Serv. (In re Lynn), 168 B.R. 693, 695 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (same); Healey v.
Massachusetts Higher Educ. (In re Healey), 161 B.R. 389, 393 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
(same); Ipsen v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Ipsen), 149 B.R. 583, 585
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (same).
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ship," those federal circuit courts that have addressed the matter have
subscribed to the Brunner three-part test.80
In Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. (In re Brun-
ner)81 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a per
curiam opinion, adopted an undue hardship standard that required a
three-part showing:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income
and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional cir-
cumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith ef-
forts to repay the loans.8 2
80. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72
F.3d 298, 300 (3d Cir. 1995) (adopting Brunner standard as controlling within cir-
cuit), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2532 (1996); Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assist-
ance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1994) (employing
Brunner standard but not formally adopting it for use within Sixth Circuit because
loans were dischargeable under Brunner, Bryant and Johnson tests); Matter of Rober-
son, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993) (adopting Brunner standard for use in
Seventh Circuit).
81. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
82. Id. at 396 (adopting standard created by district court in prior disposition
of same case). The Second Circuit determined that the three prong test devel-
oped by the district court comported with section 523(a) (8) (B)'s legislative history
and with the decisions of other district and bankruptcy courts across the country.
Id. The court found that the first prong of the test comported with common sense
and had been put to use by other courts as an aspect of other undue hardship
tests. Id. (citing Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bry-
ant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); North Dakota State Bd. of Higher
Educ. v. Frech (In re Frech), 62 B.R. 235 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); Marion v. Penn-
sylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Marion), 61 B.R. 815 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1986)). The court next stated that the second prong of the test reflected Con-
gress's intent, displayed within section 523(a)(8), to make discharge of educa-
tional debt particularly difficult. Id. Requiring evidence of both current and
future inability to repay the debt, while often speculative, more closely guarantees
that the hardship presented by the debtor is truly "undue." Id.
Based on the test adopted by the Second Circuit, the court found that the
district court had correctly ruled that the debtor's loans were nondischargeable.
Id. at 396-97. Although the debtor was unemployed, no evidence existed to show
that such condition was likely to continue for a significant portion of the repay-
ment period. Id. at 396. The debtor was not disabled or elderly, and she had no
dependents. Id. Additionally, there was no evidence to suggest that job opportuni-
ties in the debtor's chosen field were non-existent. Id. at 396-97. From the time of
the debtor's graduation to the filing of her bankruptcy petition, only ten months
had elapsed. Id. at 397. Understandably, the court found that the debtor had not
satisfied the "good faith" prong of the test, because she had filed her bankruptcy
petition within one month of the date on which the first payment on her debt
became due. Id. The debtor had filed her bankruptcy petition without attempting
to defer payment. Id.
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Because the Second Circuit's reasoning for its promulgation of this
test was quite limited, it is appropriate to examine the district court's dis-
cussion and factual findings in Brunner.8 3 The district court in Brunner
stated that its proposed test would require the debtor to do more than
simply claim that because of his or her current financial condition, repay-
ment of the loan would be "difficult or impossible."8 4  The debtor is re-
quired to show, in addition to his or her strained financial condition as
mandated by the first prong of the test, the existence of unique or excep-
tional circumstances that exhibit an inability to repay the debt in the fu-
ture, such as illness, lack of usable job skills, a large number of dependents
or a combination thereof.8 5 Additionally, the third prong of the test,
83. For a discussion of the district court's holding in Brunner, see infra notes
84-87 and accompanying text.
84. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46
B.R. 752, 754-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affid, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
85. Id. at 755 & n.2 (quoting Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Briscoe), 16 B.R.
128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)). The second prong of Brunner requires an exami-
nation of such circumstances over the duration of a "significant portion" of the
repayment period, not the entire period. Mayer v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ.
Assistance Agency (In re Mayer), 198 B.R. 116, 126 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). A
debtor may be able to satisfy this prong by establishing a combination of low in-
come and exceptional circumstances so severe that the debtor will not be able to
repay the loans. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 & n.2 (citing Shoberg v. Minnesota Higher
Educ. Coordinating Council (In re Shoberg), 41 B.R. 684, 687 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984) (finding that combination of debtor illness, lack of usable job skills and
existence of large number of dependents constituted unique and extraordinary
circumstances supporting discharge of educational loans); Dresser v. University of
Maine (In re Dresser), 33 B.R. 63, 64-65 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (same); Financial
Collection Agencies v. Norman (In re Norman), 25 B.R. 545, 550 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1982) (holding that illness constituted exceptional circumstance); Rappaport v.
Orange Say. Bank (In re Rappaport), 16 B.R. 615, 617 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (stating
that some showing of unique or exceptional circumstances is necessary, but not
indicating what would qualify as unique or exceptional); Clay v. Westmar College
(In re Clay), 12 B.R. 251, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981) (holding that large number
of dependents constitutes exceptional circumstance); Seibert v. United States
Gov't Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare (In reSeibert), 10 B.R. 704, 705 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (stating that lack of usable job skills represents exceptional circumstance)).
Additionally, a freely chosen lifestyle that limits a debtor's income cannot be
asserted by the debtor to establish that repayment of the loan would work an un-
due hardship on the debtor. Melton v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp.
(In re Melton), 187 B.R. 98, 99 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995). The court in Melton re-
jected the discharge petition submitted by a healthy 28 year-old debtor who chose
to work only 30 hours a week and combine his financial affairs with those of his
live-in girlfriend. Id. at 101-02. The debtor had argued that although he could
work a more demanding schedule, any financial improvements he received, com-
bined with his girlfriend's earnings, would be offset by a decrease in public assist-
ance, a loss of Medicaid and an increase in his child support obligation, thereby
resulting in less money for the debtor to use to repay his loans. Id. at 101. The
court rejected the debtor's argument, stating that "the idiosyncracies of assistance
programs have no relevant impact on the Brunner analysis." Id. at 102. The debtor
chose to combine his finances with his girlfriend's even though he was under no
legal obligation to provide for his girlfriend or her child. Id. If such a choice "has
the effect of reducing or limiting [the debtor's] present or future income, credi-
tors . . .should not have to subsidize that choice." Id. The debtor, therefore,
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which requires the debtor to make good faith efforts at repayment and to
establish that the cause of his or her inability to repay is beyond reason-
able control, is supported by Congress's stated purpose of section
523(a) (8): "to forestall students, who frequently have a large excess of
liabilities over assets solely because of their student loans, from abusing
the bankruptcy system to shed these loans."86 Finally, the district court in
Brunner expressed its disagreement with other courts that, in connection
with a good faith analysis like that described in Johnson, had permitted
debtors to discharge their loans upon a showing that the education re-
ceived with those loans was of little use to them.
8 7
failed the second prong of Brunner because he was able to improve his financial
condition but chose not to do so. Id. at 103. "For th[e] debtor to rest his showing
of undue hardship on a lack of potential for self-improvement created by his deci-
sion to link his financial affairs with his girlfriend's, has no authority in law." Id.
86. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANK-
RUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 140 n.14
(1973)). The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States stated that
discharge of educational debt after five years (now seven years), when a showing of
undue hardship was no longer required, would be fair because the debtor may be
unable to repay the debt due to "factors beyond his reasonable control." H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, at 140 n.16. The court in Brunner reasoned that "[i]f external
circumstances were seen as justifying discharge after five years, it is likely that only
such circumstances should be permitted to justify discharge prior to that time."
Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755.
87. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 n.3 (citing Connolly v. Florida Bd. of Regents ex rel.
Univ. of No. Fla. (In re Connolly), 29 B.R. 978, 982 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1983); Powelson
v. Stewart Sch. of Hairstyling, Inc. (In re Powelson), 25 B.R. 274, 276 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1982); Littell v. Oregon ex rel. State Bd. of Higher Educ. (In re Littell), 6 B.R
85, 88 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980)). "Consideration of this factor is not only improper, it
is antithetical to the spirit of the guaranteed loan program." Id. The court noted
that the student loan program grants aid unlike traditional, private lending pro-
grams. Id. at 756. The loan program provides loans to students regardless of their
financial security or the wisdom of the individual borrower's choice to receive an
education, whereas private lenders examine numerous factors before granting a
loan, including the borrower's projected ability to repay. Id. The government of-
fers loans at a fixed rate of interest, almost entirely without regard to the
creditworthiness of the borrower. Id. As a result, the government often lends
money to the worst credit risks-those who could not receive loans through private
lending institutions. Id. If courts are to consider the value of the education re-
ceived when determining whether to discharge educational loans, then the judici-
ary places the student loan program in a precarious position and unfairly turns the
government into "an insurer of educational value." Id. at 755 n.3.
The court further stated that although "[s]ection 523(a) (8) represents a con-
scious congressional choice to override the normal 'fresh start' goal of bank-
ruptcy," the debtor is aware of a risk that he or she may be unable to make effective
use of the education received when he or she borrows from the government and
must make the decision "whether the risks of future hardship outweigh the poten-
tial benefits of a deferred-payment education." Id. at 756 (citing Johnson v. Edin-
boro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 1984)). Such a risk is a
consequence a typically uncreditworthy individual must accept when borrowing
from the government, and section 523(a) (8) recognizes that such a borrower must
repay his or her debt regardless of subsequent economic circumstances. Id.
[Vol. 41: p. 10871110
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CASEBRIEF
Unlike the Johnson and Bryant tests, the Brunner test has received sup-
port at the appellate level.88 In Matter of Roberson,89 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the lower
court's application of the Johnson test, choosing instead to adopt the test
articulated by the Second Circuit in Brunner.90 The Seventh Circuit, after
examining the purposes and effects of the Brunner test, found that Brunner
effectively considered undue hardship while the Johnson test's "policy"
prong was a misguided inquiry that "conflict[ed] with the basic concept of
government-backed student loans."9 1 In Cheesman v. Tennessee Student
88. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72
F.3d 298, 300 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2532 (1996); Cheesman v.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 731 (1995); Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.
1993).
89. 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 1134-36. Roberson involved a debtor who had borrowed over $9,000
in order to receive a degree in industrial technology. Id. at 1133. Upon gradua-
tion, the debtor worked as an automobile assembler for Chrysler earning approxi-
mately $30,000 per year, much more than he could have received in the field of
industrial technology. Id. at 1133-34. The debtor's life then fell apart-he was
convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol and lost his license, was laid
off by Chrysler and was divorced by his wife. Id. at 1134. The debtor was ordered
to pay $121.60 per month in child support, and lost his car and house to his for-
mer wife. Id. The debtor filed for bankruptcy, reporting $18,357 in assets and
over $34,000 in debts. Id. The bankruptcy court applied the Johnson tripartite test
(although it did not expressly state that it was applying Johnson) and determined
that the educational debt was nondischargeable. Id. at 1134-35. Nevertheless, the
court did grant a two-year deferment of the debt to allow the debtor to attempt to
recover financially. Id. at 1134-35 & n.2. The bankruptcy court stated that the
debtor, although satisfying the "mechanical" and "good faith" prongs of Johnson,
had failed the "policy" prong because he would be able to use his numerous skills
in the not-too-distant future to better his situation. Id. at n.2. Additionally, the
court felt that the debtor's loss of his driver's license was a self-inflicted harm,
further supporting a finding of failure of the "policy" prong. Id. The district court
reversed and discharged the loans, stating that the bankruptcy court should not
have considered the "policy" test after finding that the "mechanical" and "good
faith" prongs had been satisfied. Id. For a discussion of the Johnson tripartite test,
see supra notes 33-64 and accompanying text.
91. Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135-36. The Seventh Circuit took issue with the
aspect of the "policy" prong that called for an examination of whether the debtor
had benefitted financially as a result of the education received with the loans. Id.
at 1136. The court stated that because the Brunner test essentially eliminated bank-
ruptcy petitions aimed at avoiding repayment of the debt there was no need for a
separate "policy" test. Id.
Congress' [s] decision to increase the availability of higher education
through student loans does not necessarily equate to a decision to insure
the future success of each student taking advantage of that opportu-
nity.... If the leveraged investment of an education does not generate
the return the borrower anticipated, the student, not the taxpayers, must
accept the consequences of the decision to borrow. Hence, we find John-
son's policy test inappropriate and decline to apply it.
Id. at 1136-37. Applying the Brunner test, the court found that the debtor's educa-
tional loans were nondischargeable because the debtor had "not indicated his
road to recovery [was] obstructed by the type of barrier that would lead us to
1996] 1111
25
Marsh: Bankruptcy Law - Discharging Student Loans under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41: p. 1087
Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman),92 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, while declining to formally adopt a standard for the cir-
cuit, applied the Brunner test and concluded that the debtors' educational
debt was properly dischargeable.
93
believe he will lack the ability to repay for several years." Id. at 1137 (citing Finan-
cial Collection Agencies v. Norman (In re Norman), 25 B.R. 545, 550 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982) (involving psychiatric problems that prevented debtor from work-
ing); Clay v. Westmar College (In re Clay), 12 B.R. 251, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1981) (regarding debtor's obligation to fully support numerous dependents); Sie-
bert v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare (In re Siebert), 10 B.R. 704,
705 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (involving lack of usable skills and limited education
of debtor)).
92. 25 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 731 (1995).
93. Id. at 359-61. In Cheesman, the debtors were a married couple who had
taken loans to attend Middle Tennessee State University. Id. at 358. Following
graduation, the debtors' net income was $13,720, and the prospects of an increase
in their income in the foreseeable future were minimal. Id. at 358-59. The debtors
only made two payments on each of their loans, and each payment made was for
less than the stated amount. Id. at 358. The debtors sent their daughter to private
school, claiming that public schools were unacceptable because they threatened
use of corporal punishment. Id. Relatives apparently provided most of the money
for the child's tuition. Id. The debtors' daughter also received medical treatment
for asthma, amounting to $140 in medical fees. Id. Further, the debtors owed over
$7,000 on a 1988 Chevrolet Nova, worth only approximately $3,000. Id. at 359.
The court found no indication that the debtors would be able to make loan
payments and maintain a minimum standard of living. Id. The debtors' expense
chart indicated that they maintained a frugal lifestyle while still incurring a $400
monthly deficit. Id. at 359-60. Further, the court determined that there was no
indication that the debtors' financial condition would improve in the foreseeable
future, based primarily on an examination of the debtors' employment histories.
Id. at 360. Finally, the court held that the debtors had acted in good faith because
they had made payments on the loans more than a year prior to filing for bank-
ruptcy. Id.
Although the court ruled that the loans were dischargeable, one circuit judge
dissented, stating that the debtors had not satisfied their burden of establishing
that their inability to repay their debt would extend for a significant portion of the
repayment period. Id. at 362 (Guy, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that be-
cause the debtors were not ill or elderly, and because they were both college-
trained, there had been no demonstration that their adversities would be pro-
longed for a significant period of time. Id. (Guy, J., dissenting). Additionally, the
dissent argued that the debtors did not act in good faith because they had made
only two payments on each of the loans over a six year period and they had not
sought additional deferments before applying for discharge of the debt. Id. (Guy,
J., dissenting).
Although the Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted the Brunner test, lower
courts have consistently cited Cheesman for the proposition that the Sixth Circuit
follows the Brunner standard for reviewing undue hardship. Cobb v. University of
Toledo (In re Cobb), 188 B.R. 22, 23 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); Hawkins v. Buena
Vista College (In re Hawkins), 187 B.R. 294, 298 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995); Daugh-
erty v. First Tenn. Bank (In re Daugherty), 175 B.R. 953, 958 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1994). Additionally, several courts within the Sixth Circuit had approved of use of
the Brunner test even before the Sixth Circuit's application of the test in Cheesman.
See Healey v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. (In re Healey), 161 B.R. 389, 393 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) (applying Brunner standard because it most adequately contemplates
undue hardship standard); Bakkum v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Bak-
kum), 139 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (same); Connor v. Michigan
1112
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Although most of the courts that have applied the Brunner standard
have found in favor of nondischargeability due to the debtor's inability to
satisfy the first or second prongs of the test,9 4 numerous bankruptcy courts
have focused their inquiries on the debtor's failure to satisfy the test's
third prong.95 The third prong of Brunner measures the debtor's good
faith attempt to repay the debt,96 emphasizing that receipt of an educa-
tion that fails to provide economic rewards does not discharge the obliga-
Dep't of Treasury (In re Connor), 83 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988)
(same).
94. See, e.g., Virginia State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Dillon, 189 B.R. 382, 385-
86 (W.D. Va. 1995) (finding that educational debt was nondischargeable based on
failure to show either current or future inability to repay loan, causing court not
even to consider "good faith" prong of Brunner test); Hawkins, 187 B.R. at 299-300
(stating that educational loan was nondischargeable because debtor had failed to
establish proof of continued financial inability to repay loan for significant period
of repayment period); McLeod v. Diversified Collection Serv. (In re McLeod), 176
B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (finding that debtor failed to show current
inability to maintain minimum standard of living while repaying loan); Ipsen v.
Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Ipsen), 149 B.R. 583, 585-86 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1992) (holding that debtor had been unable to satisfy either of first two
prongs of Brunner test); Cadle Co. v. Webb (In re Webb), 132 B.R. 199, 202 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that debtor had not demonstrated that current inability
to repay debt would extend into foreseeable future).
95. See, e.g., Coveney v. Costep Servicing Agent (In re Coveney), 192 B.R. 140,
144 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (finding that debtor who makes conscious choice to
live with and care for ill mother rather than seek employment in other cities fails
"good faith" prong because moral obligation to family member who is not legal
dependent does not take priority over legal obligation to repay debt); Walcott v.
USA Funds, Inc. (In reWalcott), 185 B.R. 721, 724-25 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995) (not-
ing that debtor's limited scope of search for employment, including unwillingness
to relocate to region with greater job opportunities, may be considered evidence of
bad faith); Daugherty, 175 B.R. at 959-60 (holding that debtor's failure to make any
effort to repay loans after obtaining deferments for six years was evidence of bad
faith); Healey, 161 B.R. at 397 (holding that debtor failed to act in good faith when
attempting to discharge debt after making only two payments without attempts to
negotiate new payment schedule with lender); Malloy v. United States (In re Mal-
loy), 144 B.R. 38, 42 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (noting that lack of effort to repay
debt may represent failure to act in good faith); Connor, 83 B.R. at 444 (holding
that debtor failed to act in good faith when she made no effort to repay loans
during time when she was gainfully employed). In most of these cases, the courts
have actually conducted an inquiry that combines the good faith issue with the first
prong of Brunner (dealing with a debtor's current inability to repay the student
loans), thereby asking whether the debtor acted in good faith to minimize ex-
penses and budget his or her monthly income. See, e.g., Dillon, 189 B.R. at 386
(holding that debtors' expenses for cable television and furniture rental prevented
debtors from satisfying first prong of Brunner standard); Healey, 161 B.R. at 394
(stating that as part of first prong of Brunner, debtor must demonstrate that he or
she actively sought to minimize expenses and maximize income).
96. See Maulin v. Sallie Mae (In re Maulin), 190 B.R. 153, 156 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Good faith is a moving target that must be tested in light of the
particular circumstances of the party under review.").
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tion to repay one's educational debt.97 Ultimately, debtors fail to establish
undue hardship because they have not taken all necessary steps, when
budgeting their resources, to make good faith efforts to repay their debt.
98
Many debtors have had their petitions for discharge denied because
they have neither attempted to make a single payment to the creditor nor
contacted the creditor about creating a modified payment plan.99 Other
debtors fail in spite of a claimed monthly deficit because they "somehow"
find a way to pay for "luxury" items such as cable television or numerous
long distance telephone calls. 100 Finally, the Brunner test has frequently
97. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46
B.R. 752, 755-56 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per
curiam). For a discussion of Brunner, see supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
98. Compare Stebbins-Hopf v. Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. (In re
Stebbins-Hopf), 176 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that debtor
failed to act in good faith when she used funds available to make repayment to
support family members who were not legally her dependents), and Healey, 161
B.R. at 397 (finding that debtor spent time and money looking for lawyer to repre-
sent her in bankruptcy proceeding rather than using time and money to make
payments and/or renegotiate payment plan with lender), with Correll v. Union
Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh (In re Correll), 105 B.R. 302, 310 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989)
(applying Johnson test and finding that $648 annual home insurance payment for
house costing $15,000 was unreasonably large), and Conner v. Illinois State Schol-
arship Comm'n (In re Conner), 89 B.R. 744, 749 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding
that debtor imposed hardship on herself by sending children to private colleges
rather than less expensive state universities).
99. E.g., Cobb v. University of Toledo (In re Cobb), 188 B.R. 22, 24 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1995) (failing to make effort to repay); Garrett v. New Hampshire
Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Garrett), 180 B.R. 358, 364 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1995) (showing lack of good faith where debtor made no payments and was una-
ware of payment plans submitted by lender); McLeod, 176 B.R. at 458 (failing
"good faith" test where debtor was unable to testify clearly regarding repayment
efforts); Daugherty, 175 B.R. at 959 (finding lack of effort to repay where debtor
obtained deferments while being gainfully employed as result of education she
received with loans); Healey, 161 B.R. at 397 (finding absence of good faith where
debtor spent time searching for lawyer to represent her in discharge proceedings
rather than spending time attempting to find way to repay debt). When examin-
ing whether the debtor has made a good faith repayment effort, the court's charac-
terization of that effort must reflect, among other things, the environment in
which the debtor's objective conduct occurred. Maulin, 190 B.R. at 156. The Mau-
tin court stated:
In those instances in which the debtor cannot maintain a minimal stan-
dard of living even without payment of student loans, the demonstration
of good faith does not necessarily command a history of payment. It does
require a history of effort to achieve repayment, such as when a borrower
diligently uses a deferment period to attempt the reorganization of her
financial affairs. On the other hand, for a previously solvent debtor, good
faith may require a history of substantial payment .... In all cases, the
debtor must come forward with evidence of efforts to achieve the same
result, that of payment, but through means that reflect a sense of good
faith under the circumstances of each particular obligor.
Id.
100. Compare Dillon, 189 B.R. at 385-86 (W.D. Va. 1995) (denying discharge of
educational debt and finding that debtor incurred $35 per month cable television
expense that could have been applied toward repayment of debt), Walcott, 185 B.R.
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been used to dismiss debtors' discharge petitions in cases where the
debtor is young, healthy, fresh out of college and has no dependents to
support.1 0 1
Consequently, many courts view the Brunner test as a strict standard
that typically results in the debtor being required to repay his or her edu-
cational debt even following the close of the debtor's Chapter 7 case. 102
at 725 (suggesting that money spent on long distance calls could have been used to
make partial payment to lender, in combination with attempt to work with lender
to renegotiate payment schedule), Wardlow v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In
reWardlow), 167 B.R. 148, 151 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993) (finding that debtors lived
above minimal standard of living, and that discharge of $25,000 of debt was, there-
fore, impermissible where debtors' monthly expenses included $100 for telephone
usage and $35 for cable television), Bakkum v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In
re Bakkum), 139 B.R. 680, 683 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that sharp in-
crease in payments for food and rent after filing of bankruptcy petition signaled
lack of good faith), and Perkins v. Vermont Student Assistance Corp. (In re Per-
kins), 11 B.R. 160, 161 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980) (finding that purchase of new car was
self-imposed hardship that evidenced lack of good faith), with Zibura v. Academic
Fin. Servs. Ass'n (In re Zibura), 128 B.R. 129, 133 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (applying
Johnson test and finding that good faith had not been established by debtor who
maintained two residences, made $60 worth of long distance phone calls per
month, had cable television, spent $50 per month on books and recreation and
paid close relatives $40 per month in relocation expenses). E.g., McLeod v. AFSA
Data Corp. (In re McLeod), 197 B.R. 624, 626 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (noting
that debtor incurred monthly expenses for cigarettes, long distance telephone
calls, cable television and other entertainment exceeding $150); Kraft v. New York
State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Kraft), 161 B.R. 82, 83 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1993) (finding that discharge was not justified and noting that debtor spent $80
per month on her "vices"-cable television and cigarettes).
101. E.g., Walcott, 185 B.R. at 723-25 (suggesting that young college graduate
relocate to cold weather city where she had family and where jobs were more plen-
tiful); Kraft, 161 B.R. at 83, 86 (holding that discharge had been attempted prema-
turely by 38 year-old recent graduate with no actual dependents). In such cases,
the court typically requires the debtor to pick up and move to a location where
jobs are more plentiful, regardless of emotional ties the debtor may have to his or
her current home. See, e.g., Walcott, 185 B.R. at 723-25 (stating that 28 year-old
debtor could leave rural North Carolina where jobs are sparse and move to Indian-
apolis where she had family and where jobs were more plentiful). The Walcott
court dismissed the debtor's complaints that Indianapolis was too cold and that
she was not interested in pursuing employment which would not turn into a job
that paid at least $12,000 per year. Id. The court ruled that because the debtor
had no dependents in North Carolina for whom to provide, there was no reason
why she could not explore employment opportunities in Indianapolis or in other
counties within North Carolina where jobs in her chosen field were more plentiful.
Id. at 724-25; see also Kraft, 161 B.R. at 86 (stating that because debtor had only
been out of school for year and one-half, she must make more extensive search for
employment within her chosen field, even though such search may have to include
examination of opportunities in other cities).
102. See Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that
stringent requirements imposed by Brunner test weed out petitions aimed at avoid-
ing responsibility to repay); Dillon, 189 B.R. at 384 (stating that Brunner test in-
volves three prongs that must be satisfied in order for discharge to be justified);
Healey, 161 B.R. at 393 (same); see also Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756 (stating that effect of
test it promulgated was to make discharge of educational loans extremely diffi-
cult); Kosel, supra note 30, at 459 ("[Slurvey of the case law indicates that the
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As the district court in Brunner recognized, because the government pro-
vides loans to students almost completely without regard for creditworthi-
ness, the government loan program can survive only if "it strips [poor
credit risks] of the refuge of bankruptcy in all but extreme
circumstances."' 0 3
When Marjorie Jo Faish appeared before the Third Circuit, the court
had yet to discuss the validity of any of the aforementioned tests. With
these various tests and goals in mind, then, the Third Circuit set out to
definitively address the proper application of section 523(a) (8) (B) in In re
Faish.
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT FOLLOWS SUIT AND ADOPTS THE BRUNNER TEST:
A DISCUSSION OF IN RE FAISH
Although the Johnson and Bryant tests originated within the Third Cir-
cuit, the circuit court itself had never officially adopted a legal standard
for its courts to apply when considering whether the facts of a Chapter 7
case gave rise to "undue hardship" under section 523(a) (8) (B). 10 4 In
Faish, the Third Circuit sought to end the confusion within the circuit
caused by the multiple tests that bankruptcy courts in the circuit were ap-
plying and adopted the standard set forth by the Second Circuit in Brunner
v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp.10 5 Based on the facts of the
case before it, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that
the debtor's educational loan debt should not be discharged in whole or
in part. 10 6
courts have interpreted the undue hardship exception quite stringently.").
Although "th[e] result may seem draconian, it plainly serves the purposes of the
guaranteed student loan program." Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756. Because the govern-
ment is acting as a lender that does not make loan determinations based on the
applicant's ability to repay the debt, the borrower must shoulder a heavy burden if
he or she hopes to have such debt discharged. Id. For a discussion regarding the
development of the Brunner standard as created by the Second Circuit, see supra
notes 79-101 and accompanying text and infra note 103 and accompanying text.
103. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756 (citing Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728
F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that promulgation of section 523(a) (8) repre-
sented congressional intent to deviate from typical "fresh start" goal of
bankruptcy)).
104. See Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In reFaish), 72
F.3d 298, 299-300 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that it had to adopt standard
for circuit because of considerable confusion on part of bankruptcy courts regard-
ing which standard to apply).
105. Id. at 300. For an explanation of the Third Circuit's reasons for adopt-
ing the Brunner standard, see infra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
106. Faish, 72 F.3d at 300. Although the Third Circuit agreed with the district
court that the debt was nondischargeable, it disagreed with the standard the dis-
trict court had applied to reach such a result. Id. For a discussion of the district
court's application of the Johnson test and the Third Circuit's rejection of Johnson,
see infra notes 116-38 and accompanying text.
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In Faish, the debtor, Marjorie Jo Faish, was an unmarried thirty year-
old woman who supported her eleven year-old son.10 7 In 1989, Faish had
received a Master's Degree in Public Health and Community Health Serv-
ices Administration from the University of Pittsburgh, incurring debt in
excess of $31,000.108 Although Faish suffered from Crohn's disease and
back problems, she had a job working for the Commonwealth in which
she earned approximately $27,000 per year. 10 9 On September 27, 1993,
nearly two years after she was required to begin repayment of her loans,
Faish filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and a complaint to determine
whether her student loans were dischargeable.1 10 As of the date of her
petition, Faish had repaid over $4,600 of her loan, but still owed in excess
of $32,000.111
In evaluating Faish's case, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania adopted the Johnson test for undue hardship. 1 2 The
court applied the first prong of the test, the "mechanical" prong and de-
termined that "Faish ha[d] failed to establish a lack of financial ability to
repay for the foreseeable future and therefore fail[ed] the 'mechanical'
prong of the Johnson test."113 The bankruptcy court, however, declined to
followJohnson's express requirement that discharge of an educational loan
must be denied if the "mechanical" prong is not satisified, and instead
conducted inquiries under Johnson's "good faith" and "policy" tests. 114
Although Faish failed the Johnson test, the bankruptcy court determined
107. Faish, 72 F.3d at 300. The debtor received no support from the child's
father. Id. She was highly concerned about the quality of the neighborhood in
which she and her son lived and was attempting to save money so that she could
move into a better apartment in a better neighborhood and buy a car. Id. At the
time of the litigation, the debtor had no car and commuted to work by bus. Id.
108. Id. Under the terms of the loan agreement, the debtor was scheduled to
begin repayment of her educational debt on October 1, 1991. Id.
109. Id. The debtor worked in the Commonwealth's Department of Public
Welfare as a budget analyst. Id. The debtor had attempted to obtain a better pay-
ingjob, but had been unsuccessful in such pursuit. Id. Although the bankruptcy
court recognized the significance of the debtor's physical ailments, it found that
her health problems did not interfere with her ability to work. Id. (citing Penn-
sylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), No. 93-01686, slip
op. at 5 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. July 12, 1994)).
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 2).
112. Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 4.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Faish, 72 F.3d at 300. Applying the "good faith" prong of Johnson, the
bankruptcy court held that Faish had "established a sufficient degree of good
faith." Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 6. The bankruptcy court also determined
that Faish had failed the "policy" test because the dominant reason for her filing of
the bankruptcy petition was to avoid her obligation to repay the loans. Id. As a
result, Faish had essentially failed the Johnson test, and discharge should have been
denied. Faish, 72 F.3d at 301.
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that it was permitted to weigh equitable considerations and held that Faish
should be relieved of approximately half of her outstanding debt.
1 15
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania reversed the bankruptcy court, stating that it was obliged to "abide
by Johnson's general framework."1 16 The district court, in dictum, recog-
nized that the bankruptcy court might be permitted to expand the scope
of Johnson, but only where the Johnson test fails to take into account situa-
tions in which "the circumstances necessary to justify discharge [are] unu-
sual, and the hardship faced in the event of full repayment [is]
substantial."'1 17 Because Faish did not establish such circumstances, the
115. Faish, 72 F.3d at 301. The bankruptcy court stated that in light of the
decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio in Woyame v.
Career Educ. &Mgmt. (In re Woyame), 161 B.R. 198 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993), bank-
ruptcy courts had some amount of discretion to discharge portions of educational
debt even where the individual prongs of Johnson had not been satisfied. Faish, No.
93-01686, slip op. at 7. For a discussion of the bankruptcy court's holding in
Woyame, see supra note 59. Even though the bankruptcy court had determined
that Faish's current job and income, as well as future prospects, were good, it ruled
that the equities of the case justified partial discharge. Faish, 72 F.3d at 301 & n.2
(citing Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 8). The bankruptcy court ordered partial
discharge even though Faish's monthly payments of approximately $300 to her
lender would not place Faish and her son below the subsistence level. Id. at 301
n.2. The bankruptcy court stated that it was influenced by Faish's desire to save
money so that she could provide a better life for her child. Faish, No. 93-01686,
slip op. at 7-8.
Although the Third Circuit rejected the bankruptcy court's decision to dis-
charge a portion of Faish's debt, the concepts of partial discharge and revision of
loan terms have received a legitimate amount of approval from bankruptcy courts
across the country. See Collins, supra note 1, at 749-53 & nn.139-71 (discussing
ideas of partial discharge, revision of loan terms and describing ways in which
bankruptcy courts have implemented such restructuring plans). Although the
topic of partial discharge as an alternative/middle ground was not discussed by the
Third Circuit and is beyond the scope of this Casebrief, one should recognize that
courts have considered it to be a valid option. See id. at 749 (stating that numerous
courts have decided to order partial discharge or revision of payment terms where
it has been impossible to apply "rigid, all-or-nothing" tests in "less than clear-cut
cases"). In his Note, Collins also discusses the importance of partial discharge and
restructuring of loan repayments in an environment where rigid undue hardship
tests may not result in a fair adjudication to the debtor and/or the lender. Id. at
753-57.
116. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), No.
94-1353, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1995). The district court explained that
although it would respect Johnson's general principles, it "would not rigidly confine
itself to Johnson's tripartite analysis," but rather, would adhere to Johnson's "general
framework." Id. The district court found that the bankruptcy judge's considera-
tion of equitable factors beyond the framework of the Johnson test, while permissi-
ble in certain circumstances, failed to present evidence of the magnitude necessary
to warrant partial discharge of educational debt. Id. at 7.
117. Id. The district court stated that a bankruptcy court may go outside of
the Johnson framework where analysis under Johnson "fails to capture scenarios re-
quiring some form of student debt relief to alleviate undue hardship." Id.
1118
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district court ruled that her educational debt was entirely
nondischargeable.1 18
On appeal, the Third Circuit first analyzed Congress's purpose for
enacting section 523(a) (8) (B) in order to ascertain how to define "undue
hardship."1 1 9 Looking to an earlier Third Circuit case, which examined
whether non-student obligors could have educational loans discharged
pursuant to section 523(a) (8) (B), 120 the court in Faish determined that
section 523(a) (8) (B) represented Congress's intent to "'rescu le] the stu-
dent loan program from fiscal doom and prevent[ ] abuse of the bank-
ruptcy process by undeserving debtors."' 121 As a result, the Third Circuit
determined that "'Congress clearly intended that most educational debt
still due within seven years of graduation should be nondischargeable."' 1 22
The court in Faish next examined the three most prominent "undue
hardship" tests (Johnson, Bryant and Brunner), as it sought to adopt a test
that would permit litigants within the circuit to present evidence effec-
tively to support or defeat a finding of undue hardship. 123
The court first examined the tripartite Johnson test and, like many
bankruptcy courts that had previously rejected Johnson, found the "tripar-
tite analysis.., to be both unnecessarily complicated and unduly cumber-
some."1 24 Though the Third Circuit recognized that the Johnson test,
when applied properly, would serve Congress's apparent objectives, it
118. Id. at 7-8. Faish's loans were nondischargeable because of her favorable
prospects for future employment. Id.
119. Faish, 72 F.3d at 301-02. For a discussion of the legislative history to sec-
tion 523 (a) (8) (B), see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text, and infra notes
151-54 and accompanying text.
120. Pelkowski v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Pelkowski), 990 F.2d 737
(3d Cir. 1993).
121. Faish, 72 F.3d at 302 (quoting Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743). The court in
Pelkowski determined that Congress, in enacting section 523(a) (8) (B), intended to
limit the ability to discharge educational debt (regardless of who signed and/or co-
signed the loan). Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 745. Therefore, the courts, in order to
preserve Congress's intent, could not construe section 523(a) (8) (B) any more nar-
rowly than that allowed by the language and legislative history of the statute. Id.
122. Faish, 72 F.3d at 302 (quoting Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 702).
123. Id. at 302-05. The court noted that while numerous bankruptcy courts
had applied a variety of undue hardship tests, no test had been so widely accepted
that it "'authoritatively guides or governs the undue hardship determination."' Id.
at 302 (quoting Collins, supra note 1, at 744). This lack of a clear uniform stan-
dard leaves a litigant confused as to which test a court will apply to the facts of his
or her individual case. Id. at 302-03 (citing Collins, supra note 1, at 747). Unless a
jurisdiction adopts a test to be applied uniformly throughout the circuit, effective
presentation of evidence regarding undue hardship is greatly hampered. Id.
Based on its reading of Collins's Note, the Third Circuit set out to definitively
adopt an undue hardship standard for application by all courts within the circuit.
Id. at 302-05. For a discussion regarding why the Third Circuit chose to adopt the
Brunner standard, see infra notes 124-38 and accompanying text.
124. Faish, 72 F.3d at 303.
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stated that the tripartite analysis of Johnson improperly restricted a bank-
ruptcy court's flexibility regarding considerations of equity.
12 5
Next, the court examined the Bryant test and refused to accept it on a
number of counts.12 6 First, the Third Circuit noted that the Bryant test
would not closely scrutinize a debtor's expenditures to determine whether
the debtor was abusing the loan program. 127 Additionally, the Third Cir-
cuit found problematic the bankruptcy court's statement in Bryant that the
debtor's motive for filing for bankruptcy should not be considered during
undue hardship analysis because "'avoiding the consequences of debts is
normally the reason for filing for bankruptcy.' '1 28 The Third Circuit
noted instead that the debtor's motive for filing a bankrupcy petition was
highly relevant "because one of the reasons that Congress enacted section
523(a) (8) (B) was in response to 'reports of students discharging student
loan debts after graduation and subsequently accepting high-paying
jobs."' 129
Finally, the Third Circuit analyzed the Brunner test and concluded
that of the three tests considered, it was "the most consistent with the
scheme that Congress established in 1978."130 The court found that the
Brunner test best reflected Congress's desire to preserve the educational
loan program's integrity by placing a significant burden on a debtor seek-
ing to have his or her educational loan obligations discharged.1 3 1 Thus,
125. Id. at 303-04. The court stated that the Johnson test, if properly applied,
would work to deny most petitions for discharge after application of the "mechani-
cal" test. Id. at 303. By denying discharge after analysis under the "mechanical"
prong, courts would be serving the goal of protecting the integrity of the student
loan program. Id. (citing Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743-44). Additionally, the "policy"
and "good faith" prongs of Johnson may provide some level of protection against
abuse of the bankruptcy process. Id.
126. Id. at 304.
127. Id. Debtors often find themselves in bankruptcy court precisely because
"subjective value judgments" are often representative of their inability to ade-
quately budget their income. Id. Bankruptcy courts should be permitted to
consider these value judgments when ruling on the propriety of discharge of edu-
cational loans, Id.
128. Id. (quoting Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In
re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).
129. Id. (quoting Wiese, supra note 2, at 446).
130. Id. at 305. The Third Circuit determined that it should adopt the Brun-
ner test based on an analysis of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Matter of Roberson,
999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993). Id. Not only did the Third Circuit agree with the
Roberson court that the Brunner test most closely comported with the goals of pre-
serving the student loan program and preventing abuse of the bankruptcy process,
the Third Circuit agreed that the Johnson test was entirely unworkable. Id. The
Third Circuit further stated that Johnson is unnecessarily cumbersome because its
multiple tests have masked the law. Id. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Roberson, see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
131. Faish, 72 F.3d at 305-06. The Faish court also discussed the particular
advantages associated with the Brunner test. Id. The court concluded that the
Brunner test is most effective because it requires a debtor who has received the
benefits of an education to establish that repayment would cause more than mere
personal and financial sacrifices. Id. Further, the Brunner test is preferable be-
1120 [Vol. 41: p. 1087
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the Third Circuit determined that "the Brunner'undue hardship' test must
now be applied by bankruptcy courts within the Third Circuit."13 2
Following its decision to adopt the Brunner test, the Third Circuit ap-
plied the test to the facts of the case before it.13 3 The court ruled that
when applying the Brunner test it could not consider equitable concerns or
other factors "not contemplated by the Brunner framework" in order to
support the dischargeability of educational debt.1
3 4
The Third Circuit found that under Brunner, Faish's educational debt
was entirely nondischargeable.13 5 Applying the first prong of the Brunner
test, the court found that Faish had not established that she and her son
would currently be unable to maintain a minimal standard of living if she
had to repay her loans.13 6 Because Faish failed the first prong, the court
stated that it did not need to examine the second or third elements of the
cause it does not entail the faulty Johnson "policy" test nor does it involve Bryant's
deference to the spending habits of debtors. Id. at 306. Finally, the three-step
Brunner approach is quite easy to follow and apply. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 306-07. The court ruled that "[aIll three elements of the test must
be satisfied individually before a discharge can be granted." Id. at 306 (citing Rob-
erson, 999 F.2d at 1135). The court stated that it did not have to remand the case
for a determination as to whether Faish had established that repayment would
impose an undue hardship on her because sufficient facts existed in the record
from the previous dispositions of the case. Id. at 306 n.4.
134. Id. (citing Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206
(1988)). "Whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts can only be
exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." Id.
135. Id. at 306-07.
136. Id. at 306. The bankruptcy court had found that repayment, although
significantly affecting Faish and her son, would not place Faish below the subsis-
tence level. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re
Faish), No. 93-01686, slip op. at 5 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.July 12, 1994)). The first prong
of the Brunner test requires the debtor to show more than just tight finances. Id.
Faish had failed to present evidence to show that due to her income and expenses
she would fall below a minimal standard of living if forced to repay her loans. Id.
Faish had a steady job and made $27,000 per year. Id.
The Third Circuit, responding to Faish's claim that discharge should be
granted because she had been unable to find ajob in her chosen field, emphasized
its holding by comparing Faish's situation with that faced by the debtor in Brunner
v. New York State Higher Educ. Sers. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1987). Faish, 72 F.3d at 306-07. The Third Circuit stated that the financial hard-
ship faced by the debtor in Brunner was much more serious than that faced by
Faish. Id. at 307. Because the Second Circuit, in Brunner, had determined that
discharge of the debtor's student loans was inappropriate, Faish's debt would have
to be nondischargeable. Id. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's holding in
Brunner and how other courts have applied the Brunner standard, see supra notes
79-103 and accompanying text.
The court determined that Faish could overcome her inability to repay the
debt simply by engaging in a serious plan of short-term financial budgeting. Faish,
72 F.3d at 307; see also McLeod v. AFSA Data Corp. (In re McLeod), 197 B.R. 624,
628 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (citing Faish with approval and stating that debtor
who earned $29,094.52 per year did not demonstrate inability to maintain minimal
standard of living even though she anticipated five percent pay reduction in near
future).
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test-Faish's entire educational debt was nondischargeable.1 37 Yet, the
court attempted to bolster its holding by conducting a good faith analy-
sis-it emphasized that the facts of the case called for a finding of nondis-
chargeability because Faish wanted to discharge her debt in order to "free
up" money to buy a new car and move into a better apartment. 13 8
IV. POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S HOLDING
IN IN RE FAISH
The Third Circuit's decision to adopt the Brunner test will generally
persuade courts within the circuit to find that educational loans are non-
dischargeable.13 9 The results of prior cases in which courts have applied
the Brunner test reveal that the test is a strenuous one that is rarely over-
come by the debtor. 140 If Congress intended, in enacting section
137. Faish, 72 F.3d at 306. With Brunner's requirement that all three prongs
be satisfied in order to permit discharge, the failure to satisfy the first prong of the
test warrants an abrupt end to judicial scrutiny of the discharge petition. See Rober-
son, 999 F.2d at 1135 (stating that Brunner requires all prongs of test to be met
before ordering discharge).
138. Faish, 72 F.3d at 307.
139. See Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 702 & n.27 (stating that regardless
of test used, most courts find that debtor has not established undue hardship, and
listing Brunner as support for such statement).
140. See Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1137 (applying Brunner and finding discharge
impermissible because debtor had not satisfied second prong of test); Virginia
State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Dillon, 189 B.R. 382, 385 (W.D. Va. 1995) (denying
discharge because debtor had not satisfied first prong of Brunner); Cobb v. Univer-
sity of Toledo (In re Cobb), 188 B.R. 22, 24 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (denying
petition for discharge after finding that debtor's medical condition did not pre-
vent him from performing employment duties); Hawkins v. Buena Vista College
(In re Hawkins), 187 B.R. 294, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995) (finding that debtor
failed second prong of Brunner because she was unable to establish that present
financial hardship would persist for life of repayment period); Walcott v. USA
Funds, Inc. (In reWalcott), 185 B.R. 721, 724-25 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995) (finding
that young debtor who had no dependents had not exhausted all options for find-
ing employment in other regions of country); Stebbins-Hopf v. Texas Guaranteed
Student Loan Corp. (In re Stebbins-Hopf), 176 B.R. 784, 787-88 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1994) (holding that debtor had not established undue hardship even though she
suffered from health problems); Healey v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. (In re Hea-
ley), 161 B.R. 389, 394-97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that debtor failed all
three Brunner prongs); Ford v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Ford),
151 B.R. 135, 138-39 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1993) (finding that despite debtor's med-
ical restrictions, there was no showing of undue hardship because debtor had
placed unnecessary restrictions on her own ability to work). But see Cheesman v.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356, 359-60 (6th
Cir. 1994) (applying Brunner and finding that debtor had established undue hard-
ship because of employment history and fact that debtors had not filed for bank-
ruptcy immediately after initial deferment period had ended); Mayer v.
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Mayer), 198 B.R. 116, 125-28
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (permitting discharge where debtor's mental illness made
her essentially unemployable even though debtor vigorously denied existence of
mental instability); Ammirati v. Nellie Mae, Inc. (In re Ammirati), 187 B.R. 902,
904-05 (D.S.C. 1995) (finding that health problems of debtor and his dependents
and inability of debtor to find higher paying job, despite absence of extensive
1122
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523(a) (8) (B), to make dischargeability of educational debt difficult, then
the Brunner test clearly effectuates that goal.
1 4 1
The Brunner test presents an overwhelming obstacle to dis-
chargeability primarily because of its stringent requirement that the
debtor satisfy all three prongs of the test.142 Typically, debtors will not be
able to satisfy Brunneis first prong: that their current financial conditions
will place them below a minimal standard of living if forced to repay the
debt.1 43 Even if a debtor is capable of satisfying the first prong of Brunner,
he or she is likely to have difficulty satisfying the second prong of the
test.144 The requirement that the debtor establish extraordinary future
search by debtor, revealed present inability to maintain minimum standard of liv-
ing if forced to repay debt).
141. See Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In reBrunner),
46 B.R. 752, 755-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that test created was aimed at meeting
congressional goals of preserving student loan program and preventing abuse of
bankruptcy process), affd, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also
Lohman v. Connecticut Student Loan Found. (In re Lohman), 79 B.R1 576, 581
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1987) (stating that Congress's goal regarding section 523(a) (8) (B)
was to permit discharge of educational debt only in rare cases where debtor had
established existence of exceptional circumstances).
142. Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135.
143. See, e.g., Dillon, 189 B.R. at 385 (holding that debtor had not satisfied first
prong of Brunner because debtor had stated she could make monthly payments on
her loans of $50 to $75); Daugherty v. First Tenn. Bank (In re Daugherty), 175 B.R.
953, 959 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994) (finding that record did not support debtor's
claim that she was unable to work because of health problems); Sands v. United
Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 309-10 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1994) (holding that debtor failed to show that he had maximized his financial
resources); Healey, 161 B.R. at 394-95 (same); Ipsen v. Higher Educ. Assistance
Found. (In re Ipsen), 149 B.R. 583, 585-86 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that
debtor failed first prong of Brunner because husband provided her housing, her
mother paid her car loan and her job provided sufficient income to require debtor
to repay her student loans).
144. Numerous cases reveal the difficulties debtors face when attempting to
establish that their financial situation in the future will be poor enough to warrant
discharge in the present. See, e.g., Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1137 (stating that debtor
failed second prong of Brunner because he possessed skills necessary to improve his
financial condition in foreseeable future and because most of his current financial
probl6ms stemmed from self-imposed hardship); Hawkins, 187 B.R. at 300 (hold-
ing that prospects for debtor were good because she was intelligent, in good
health, and because her youngest child was nearly old enough to support himself);
Walcott, 185 B.R at 725 (finding that although repayment may currently impose
hardship on debtor, inability to repay was not likely to extend for substantial por-
tion of repayment period because debtor had potential employment opportunities
located in other areas of country); Stebbins-Hopf 176 B.R. at 787-88 (holding that
debtor's health problems did not prevent her from future employment, raises and
promotions). Further, some courts have stated that the debtor failed the second
prong of Brunnerbecause his or her financial condition might improve in the fore-
seeable future because the debtor's child or children would soon reach the age of
majority. See McLeod v. AFSA Data Corp. (In re McLeod), 197 B.R. 624, 629
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (stating that debtor failed second prong of Brunner in
part because her obligation to care for her son would terminate in 1999); Simons
v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Simons), 119 B.R. 589, 593 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990) (finding debtors' circumstances likely to improve in foreseeable future
11231996]
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circumstances which will inhibit repayment of the loan for years to come
actually forces the debtor to look into a crystal ball and envision what is
often an uncertain future. Yet, because the burden is on the debtor to
firmly establish continuing financial hardship, the Brunner test will more
often than not result in a court ruling in favor of nondischargeability of
educational debt. 145
Although the Brunner test is harsh on debtors, its promulgation and
adoption by the Third Circuit are understandable.1 46 The tests developed
prior to Brunner provided considerable leeway for debtors to escape an
obligation of which they were fully aware when they applied for their
loans. 1 47 Debtors receive no guarantees that an education paid for in part
because their 16 year-old son was close to age of majority); Lohman, 79 B.R. at 584
(holding that debtor's obligation to support 18 year-old child did not warrant find-
ing of undue hardship where debtor failed to establish that obligation would con-
tinue beyond high school graduation).
Nevertheless, it is possible for a debtor to satisfy the second prong of the Brun-
ner test. See Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1137 (citing Norman v. Financial Collection
Agencies (In re Norman), 25 B.R. 545, 550 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (permitting
discharge of debt where psychiatric problems prevent debtor from working); Clay
v. Westmar College (In re Clay), 12 B.R. 251, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981) (al-
lowing discharge where debtor had numerous dependents to fully support); Sie-
bert v. United States Gov't Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare (In reSiebert), 10 B.R.
704, 705 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (discharging debt where debtor has few usable
skills and severely limited education)); see also Coveney v. Costep Servicing Agent
(In re Coveney), 192 B.R. 140, 143 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) ("Cases where the
debtor met the second prong of the Brunner test exhibited a combination of low
income and exceptional circumstances so severe that the debtor would not have
been able to repay the loans."). For a discussion of the second prong of Brunner,
see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
145. For a discussion of the cases in which courts found that a debtor had not
satisfied the second prong of the Brunner test, see supra note 144 and accompany-
ing text. One court, however, determined that a debtor had satisfied the second
prong of Brunnerby examining the debtor'sjob history and finding that an inabil-
ity to repay the debt would persist well into the future. See Raimondo v. New York
State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Raimondo), 183 B.R. 677, 679 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1995) (permitting partial discharge of educational debt even though un-
employed debtor presented no special circumstances indicating that unemploy-
ment would persist through repayment period because evidence indicated that
based on his last job, debtor would not earn income in excess of $18,000 per year
during term of repayment period).
146. See Michele S. Greif, Comment, Bankruptcy-Dischargeability-For a Stu-
dent-Loan Debt to be Discharged Pursuant to the "Undue Hardship" Exception in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a Grievous Irrevocable Financial Situation Which Placed the Debtor Near or
Below the Poverty Level, Must Exist Throughout Most of the Repayment Period-Penn-
sylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 26 SETON HALL L.
REv. 949, 955 (1996) ("The standard adopted by the Third Circuit in Faish demon-
strates a reasonable and equitable approach to evaluating whether a student loan
debt is dischargeable pursuant to the 'undue hardship' exception in the Bank-
ruptcy Code."). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning for adopting the
Brunner test, see supra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
147. SeeBrunner v. NewYork State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner),
46 B.R. 752, 754-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (describing other tests used by bankruptcy
courts to justify discharge of educational debt), affd, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987)
(per curiam). For a discussion of the holding in Brunner, see supra notes 81-87 and
1124
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or in full by government-backed loans will result in immediate financial
stability, a fact of which borrowers are aware when they choose to bor-
row.148 To permit borrowers/debtors essentially to "have their cake and
eat it too" without having to overcome a stringent burden, would lead to
the ultimate and speedy bankruptcy of the government-backed student
loan program. 1 49 Congress has a legitimate interest in ensuring that this
does not occur, and the courts have recognized their role in promoting
the continued existence of an institution that benefits thousands of stu-
dents each year.1 50
By adopting the Brunner test, the Third Circuit has taken the neces-
sary step to further the public policy originally recognized by the drafters
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-that the student loan program
must not be abused if it is to continue to exist and aid students in need.15 1
Although the legislative history to section 523(a) (8) (B) is not dispositive,
accompanying text. For a discussion of the other tests applied by bankruptcy
courts across the country, including the Johnson and Bryant tests, see supra notes 33-
78 and accompanying text.
148. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756; see Greif, supra note 146, at 955 ("A student loan
is a voluntary purchase of debt that makes repayment a binding obligation; as
such, it should only be discharged in the most dire circumstances.").
149. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756. This result would ensue, of course, because the
government does not have the luxury afforded to private commercial lenders of
investigating the finances of the borrowers before deciding whether to grant
credit. Id. Also, the government grants loans at a fixed rate of interest, regardless
of the borrower's creditworthiness, making the existence of the student loan pro-
gram even more precarious. Id. For a discussion of the Brunner test and the rea-
sons for its creation, see supra notes 81-87, 94-103 and accompanying text.
150. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756.
151. See Pelkowski v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Pelkowski), 990 F.2d
737, 742-43 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing purposes of enactment of section 523(a) (8)
(citing 124 CONG. REc. 1791, 1791-93 (1978))). The court in Pelkowski stated that
the statements of the members of the House of Representatives who supported
section 523(a) (8) provide the strongest indication of legislative intent regarding
the provision. Id. at 742. In describing the purpose of section 523(a) (8), Repre-
sentative Ertel, of Pennsylvania, stated:
[Section 523(a) (8) was intended] to keep our student loan programs in-
tact .... [Tihe default rate in the student loan program has been esca-
lating to tremendous proportions in the past year .... [T]he number of
students going into bankruptcy-or ex-students-has increased ...
Without this amendment, we are discriminating against future students,
because there will be no funds available for them to get an education.
124 CONG. Ruc. at 1791-92. Additionally, Representative Erlenborn attacked debt-
ors who, "not having assets to pledge, [are] pledg[ing their] future earning power.
Having pledged that future earning power, if, shortly after graduation and before
having an opportunity to repay the debt, [they] seek[ ] to discharge that obliga-
tion, I say that is tantamount to fraud." Id. at 1793. Having analyzed the applica-
ble legislative history, the court in Pelkowski concluded that "'Congress enacted 11
U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) in an effort to prevent abuses in and protect the solvency of the
educational loan programs."' Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743 (quoting Andrews Univ. v.
Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1992)). For a further dis-
cussion of the applicable legislative history surrounding the enactment of section
523(a) (8), see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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it appears that Congress was acting in a reactionary mode, attempting to
thwart a growing national trend in which recent college graduates would
file for bankruptcy in order to have their educational loans discharged. 152
Section 523(a) (8) (B), therefore, is an expression of Congress's desire to
make discharge of educational debt as infrequent as possible. 153 To inter-
pret section 523(a) (8) (B) differently would render it nothing more than
superfluous language, something that would be absurd considering the
fact that it was included within the Bankruptcy Reform Act.1 54 The Brun-
ner test is, therefore, judicial application of a policy that Congress deter-
mined should be furthered. 155
Moreover, an examination of the present-day economy supports the
implementation of a stringent test such as that developed in Brunner. It
appears that recent college graduates are experiencing difficulty in secur-
ing employment after graduation. 15 6 As a result, a borrower's typical
152. See 124 CONG. Rxc. at 1791 (discussing congressional motive regarding
enactment of section 523(a) (8)). For a discussion of what members of Congress
said about the need to enact section 523(a) (8), see supra note 151 and accompany-
ing text.
153. SeeJohnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 1984)
(stating that section 523(a) (8) represents clear congressional goal that normal
"fresh start" approach of bankruptcy is not to extend to situations in which debtors
attempt to discharge government-backed educational loans). The government's
goal is not to make life unbearable for borrowers who experience financial set-
backs, yet section 523(a) (8) (B) does express Congress's desire that borrowers
weigh the risks of potential future hardship against the benefits of a government-
sponsored education before deciding whether to accept a student loan and its
terms. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756 & n.4.
154. See Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 742 (indicating that Congress enacted section
523(a) (8) as response to concern of legislators and members of public regarding
increase in bankruptcy filings by students before they could embark on lucrative
careers) (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pts. I & 11 (1973))). Additionally, section
523(a) (8) has been amended on numerous occasions, always in an attempt to ex-
pand its coverage, signifying Congress's intent that discharge of educational debt
be extremely rare. Id. at 743 (noting that Congress's decision to amend time inter-
val before student loans can become dischargeable from five years to seven years
supports such interpretation).
155. See Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395,
396 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that three-prong test created by district
court is reasonable in light of congressional intent that discharge of educational
loans be more difficult than discharge of other types of nonexcepted debt). In
Matter of Roberson, the Seventh Circuit expressly stated that each prong of the Brun-
ner test comports with aspects of congressional intent displayed in the legislative
history to section 523(a)(8). 999 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1993). For a discus-
sion of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Roberson, see supra notes 89-91 and accom-
panying text.
156. See, e.g., Walcott v. USA Funds, Inc. (In reWalcott), 185 B.R. 721, 721-23
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995) (involving debtor who had only one full-time position in
four years since graduation and that such job lasted only three months). In
Walcott, the debtor, upon graduation, had applied for professional positions, but
was told she was underqualified. Id. at 722. She then applied for positions as a
salesperson, restaurant hostess and child care provider, but was turned down be-
cause she was overqualified. Id. As a result of this "catch-22" situation, the debtor
1126 [Vol. 41: p. 1087
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deferment period often expires before he or she has found ajob that will
enable the borrower to maintain a minimal standard of living and make
loan payments.1 5 7 Because of this dilemma, the temptation exists for
young graduates to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 with the hope that
bankruptcy courts will discharge their educational debt, rather than con-
tact creditors to obtain additional deferments or re-work payment sched-
ules. Certainly, the present job market would favor dischargability in the
absence of a stringent test aimed at deterring abuse of the educational
loan program. 158 The test enumerated in Brunner, and adopted by the
Third Circuit in Faish, reflects an understanding that recent college gradu-
ates should escape liability for their educational debt only if they can af-
firmatively establish that time will not result in an improved financial
condition. 159
was forced to obtain low-paying part-time jobs that never seemed to last. Id.; see also
Kraft v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Kraft), 161 B.R. 82, 83-84
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (involving debtor with degree preparing her for work in
tourism industry who had to accept job dispatching tow trucks for five dollars per
hour). In Kraft, the debtor spent two years attempting to find a full-time position
in her chosen field without success. Id. To obtain a job in her chosen field, the
debtor was told she needed three years of experience. Id. at 83. Because she was
unable to secure a full-time job in the field for which she was trained, the debtor
accepted low-paying positions as a tow truck dispatcher, a tour bus operator and a
school bus driver in order to earn income. Id. at 84; see also Healey v. Massachu-
setts Higher Educ. (In re Healey), 161 B.R. 389, 391 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (involving
28 year-old debtor who found minimal full-time employment over three-year pe-
riod following receipt of degree in education).
157. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Buena Vista College (In re Hawkins), 187 B.R. 294,
296-97 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995) (involving debtor who filed for bankruptcy after
three years of unsuccessful attempts to obtain teaching position); Walcott, 185 B.R.
at 722 (involving situation in which four years had expired since debtor's gradua-
tion and she still had not obtained meaningful full-time employment).
158. See Walcott, 185 B.R. at 723-25 (stating that although debtor had shown
legitimate efforts to find employment, Brunner test required debtor to expand
scope of her job search because debtor was smart, articulate, healthy and had fam-
ily support in other regions of country). Although it may appear that discharge
should be permitted for an individual who has continually attempted but failed to
find meaningful employment, the Brunner test, like the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 from which the Brunner test derives, requires the debtor to exhaust all future
options. Id.; see also Kraft, 161 B.R. at 86-87 (stating that debtor sought discharge
too quickly-before "she gave 'life after discharge' a fair chance and before she
gave opportunities inside and outside [her chosen field] a fair chance"). While
such debtors may appear to be worthy candidates for discharge, it seems that they
have become victims of abuses committed by those who are less needy. See Rap-
paport v. Orange Say. Bank (In re Rappaport), 16 B.R. 615, 616 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1981) (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 133 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6094) ("A few serious abuses of the bankruptcy laws by debtors with large
amounts of educational loans, few other debts, and well-paying jobs, who have filed
bankruptcy shortly after leaving school and before any loans became due, have
generated the movement for an exception to discharge.").
159. Walcott, 185 B.R. at 725 (interpreting second prong of Brunner test); Hea-
ley, 161 B.R. at 396 (same); Kraft, 161 B.R. at 86-87 (same). In Healey, the court
stated:
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Given that the Brunner test is a bright-line rule, a debtor seeking to
have his or her debt discharged must find a way to conform to the three-
prong test that the Brunner court developed. 160 As a result, the success of
a Chapter 7 debtor attempting to have his or her educational debt dis-
charged will depend heavily on the facts of that particular debtor's life.' 61
An examination of how a debtor can satisfy the three prongs of Brunner
reveals just how true it is that success or failure relies heavily on the facts of
an individual case.
Because the first prong of the Brunner test requires the debtor to show
that he or she will be unable to maintain a minimal standard of living if
forced to repay the educational debt, the debtor must establish a lack of
available means of effecting repayment. 162 First, the debtor must show
that because of a low-paying job that offers little or no opportunity for
advancement, his or her income is inadequate to avoid a monthly defi-
cit. 163 Yet, the existence of a monthly deficit is meaningless if the debtor
The experience of life teaches us that, other than the privileged few, all
encounter intervals in which they cannot do precisely what they desire
because it simply does not pay enough money. A resolute determination
to work in one's field of dreams, no matter how little it pays, cannot be
the fundamental standard from which "undue hardship" under
§ 523(a) (8) (B) is measured.
Healey, 161 B.R. at 395; see also Wheeler v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n, No. 93-CV-
341S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1622, at *13-14 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1994) (stating that
poor economic conditions and poor job market do not constitute compelling "ad-
ditional circumstance" warranting discharge of educational debt because undue
hardship inquiry focuses on debtor, and state of national or local economy cannot,
by itself, establish that debtor's financial condition will persist through life of re-
payment period).
160. See Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135 (stating that debtor must satisfy all three
prongs of Brunner in order to have debt discharged).
161. See Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner),
46 B.R1 752, 754-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (developing test that requires debtor to show
that repayment of debt will cause him or her to fall below minimum standard of
living and to show that extraordinary or unique circumstances exist that warrant find-
ing that debtor's situation will not improve in foreseeable future). The require-
ment that the debtor show additional extraordinary or unique circumstances
indicates that the Brunner standard is quite fact sensitive. See id. at 755 (describing
individual situations that could amount to unique or extraordinary circumstance
faced by debtor).
162. Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135.
163. See, e.g., Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Chees-
man), 25 F.3d 356, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1994) (determining that debtor could not
maintain minimum standard of living if forced to repay student loans because he
was already experiencing monthly deficit of $400); Ammirati v. Nellie Mae, Inc. (In
re Ammirati), 187 B.R. 902, 907 (D.S.C. 1995) (finding that debtor had satisfied
first prong of Brunner in part because monthly expenses, while being minimized,
still exceeded monthly income); Stebbins-Hopf v. Texas Guaranteed Student Loan
Corp. (In re Stebbins-Hopf), 176 B.R. 784, 787 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (involving
debtor who satisfied first prong of Brunner solely because her expenses exceeded
income by $400 per month); Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re
Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 308 & n.15 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994) (finding that debtor's
expenses exceeded his gross income by $50 to $100 per month, and that in order
for him to make even $10 monthly payment on his loan, court would have to find
1128
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has not attempted to spend more conservatively the money he or she actu-
ally has.1 6 4 Second, the debtor's cause will be greatly benefitted if he or
she has an ill spouse who is incapable of working or has several children to
support.1 65 Where the debtor is responsible for so many people, a court is
less apt to suggest that the debtor move to a new location where better-
paying jobs may be more plentiful. 166 Third, and most essential to surviv-
ing the first prong of the Brunner test, the debtor must eliminate expenses
for "luxury items."1 67 The debtor must establish that he or she has worked
way to trim $60 to $110 off his monthly expenses). Production of financial records
that establish a consistent monthly deficit is liable to cause a bankruptcy court to
inquire further into whether undue hardship may be present. See Cheesman, 25
F.3d at 358-60 (finding that debtor had satisfied first prong of Brunner by present-
ing records of consistent monthly deficit for three years).
164. See Mayer v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Mayer),
198 B.R. 116, 125-26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that first prong of Brunner/
Faish was met where debtor acted to minimize expenses by moving from her own
dwelling, with her baby, to live with her family in public housing unit in another
state); Healey, 161 B.IR at 394-95 (holding that debtor must maximize personal and
professional resources along with duty to minimize expenses). Very often, maxi-
mizing resources will require the debtor to accept a better-paying job outside his
or her chosen field. Id. at 395; see also Sands, 166 B.R. at 308-09 (finding that
although debtor had minimized expenses, he had not attempted to maximize his
income mainly because he had not consistently and diligently searched for employ-
ment). Although the existence of a monthly deficit may be persuasive, it alone will
not act to establish undue hardship. See Healey, 161 B.R. at 394-95 (holding that
monthly deficit, in face of showing of failure to maximize income, was insufficient
to satisfy first prong of Brunner); Ballard v. Virginia ex rel. State Educ. Assistance
Auth. (In re Ballard), 60 B.R. 673, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986) (holding that no
undue hardship existed where debtor had shown that expenses exceeded income
by $400).
165. See Mayer, 198 B.R. at 125 (considering fact that debtor had baby to sup-
port); Ammirati, 187 B.R at 904 (ruling in favor of discharge of student loans of
debtor whose dependents included ill wife and granddaughter); Hawkins v. Buena
Vista College (In re Hawkins), 187 B.R. 294, 296, 299 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995)
(finding that debtor satisfied first prong of Brunner after considering fact that
debtor had four young children); Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 (stating that debtor satis-
fied first prong of test because illness and large number of dependents qualified as
extraordinary circumstances).
166. See Walcott v. USA Funds, Inc. (In re Walcott), 185 B.R. 721, 723, 725
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that where debtor has no dependents and is re-
sponsible only for her own support, court may require debtor to make greater
effort to obtain employment that will permit her to make payments on student
loans); Kraft v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In reKraft), 161 B.R. 82,
83, 86 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that debtor who no longer houses or
otherwise supports her three children has no dependents and therefore must per-
sist in attempts to find more lucrative employment).
167. See Virginia State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Dillon, 189 B.R. 382, 386
(W.D. Va. 1995) (holding that debtors' decision to retain their cable television and
to continue $100 per month payments on debt to furniture company provided
evidence that first prong of Brunner had not been satisfied); Wakott, 185 B.R. at
725 (finding that debtor had made only one $50 payment on her debt but contin-
ued to spend $25 to $50 per month on personal phone calls); Wardlow v. Great
Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Wardlow), 167 B.R. 148, 151 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1993) (stating that debtor failed first prong of Brunner because he spent nearly
19961 1129
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to budget available funds and has not carried on in a lavish manner.
168
This means that the debtor must disconnect the cable television, reduce or
even eliminate long distance telephone calls, and otherwise show the
court that he or she has engaged in strenuous financial belt-tightening.
169
Even assuming the debtor can satisfy the first prong of Brunner, it is
unlikely he or she will be able to demonstrate that financial straits will run
for a significant portion of the repayment period. Because the debtor has
received the benefits of an education, it is hard for a debtor to argue that
he or she will be unable to obtain meaningful employment in the near
future if the debtor conducts a serious job search.170 To satisfy the second
$300 per month on telephone charges, cable television, recreation and miscellane-
ous expenses); Kraft, 161 B.R. at 83 (noting that debtor maintained "vices" of
purchasing cigarettes and subscribing for cable television (including HBO) at rate
of $80 per month); Ipsen v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Ipsen), 149 B.R.
583, 585 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (taking issue with debtor's prior monthly ex-
pense of $50 for life insurance premiums).
168. Wardlow, 167 B.R. at 151.
169. For a discussion of the cases in which courts have denied discharge of
educational debt based on the debtor's cavalier expenditures, see supra note 167.
If a court is able to discover an unnecessary expense, it is likely to deny discharge
because the money spent by the debtor could have been used to make some form
of monthly payment on the student debt. See Dillon, 189 B.R. at 386 (stating that
money spent on cable television and furniture payments could have been used to
make payments on educational debt); Walcott, 185 B.R. at 725 (implying that
money spent on phone calls could have been applied to loan repayment); Wardlow,
167 B.R. at 151 (stating that $300 per month spent on luxury items could have
been applied to reduce outstanding balance on $25,000 student loan).
170. See Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756 & n.3 (rejecting argument that courts should
permit discharge where education received has not benefitted debtor). For a dis-
cussion of the holding in Brunner, see supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
See also Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that be-
cause government has made loans available to students who ordinarily would not
be able to receive financing for education from private lenders, students have re-
sponsibility to utilize education received with government-backed loans and use
best efforts to obtain employment, minimize expenses and maximize income).
Typically, where a debtor has received a college education, courts are reluctant to
find that, over the life of his or her loan, the debtor will be unable to obtain ajob
that will permit repayment of the debt. See Walcott, 185 B.R. at 725 (stating that
debtor is well-educated and articulate, and therefore, should be able to find a bet-
terjob in near-future that will permit her to repay debt); Healey v. Massachusetts
Higher Educ. (In re Healey), 161 B.R. 389, 396 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (stating that
debtor had not satisfied second prong of Brunner because education received pre-
pared her to succeed in her chosen field).
As a result of Brunner and other similar holdings, it would appear that students
who receive degrees from law schools and medical schools are almost automati-
cally excluded from the list of debtors who could potentially have their educational
debts discharged because their opportunities for financial success within the typi-
cal ten-year repayment period are virtually limitless. See Healy, 161 B.R. at 396
(holding that second prong of Brunner test cannot be met where debtor receives
degree from "highly regarded" institution and has marketable skills). Because an
individual fresh out of law school or medical school is obviously well-educated and
possesses highly specified training in a field that provides numerous high-paying
opportunities, he or she cannot reasonably expect that the debt incurred for such
education will be dischargeable. See Gilchrist v. Department of Educ., No. 88-
[Vol. 41: p. 10871130
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prong of Bnnner, therefore, the debtor must present substantial evidence
of prior employment history suggesting that, even with the acquisition of a
better job, the debtor's financial condition would not improve considera-
bly in the near future. 171 A debtor must first present a bleak picture re-
garding employment in the field for which the debtor has received a
government-financed education.1 72 Urging a court to find that a bleak
employment future constitutes a unique or extraordinary circumstance
may be quite difficult, especially because the court may order the debtor
to investigate job opportunities outside his or her chosen field.1 73 Such
an outcome should not be surprising because courts will often find that
5106, 1988 WL 145098, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1988) (denying discharge of stu-
dent loan that was applied to debtor's law school tuition where debtor had passed
bar examination and had been admitted to practice, even though debtor was un-
employed and suffering from chronic depression); Kraft, 161 B.R. at 87 (stating
that court may be more likely to find that second prong of Brunner standard has
been met where debtor can establish that he or she has long history of minimum
wage employment after receiving degree and has no prospects for financial pros-
perity despite continued efforts).
The situation presented in Garrett v. New Hampshire Higher Education Assistance
Foundation (In re Garrett), 180 B.R. 358 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995), reveals an interest-
ing twist on the fate of a recent law school graduate. In Garrett, the debtor had
graduated from Western New England College, School of Law in 1990. Id. at 361.
She took the New Hampshire bar examination but did not pass, and never at-
tempted to take any other bar exam. Id. In 1992, however, the debtor and her
husband were jailed for eight months after pleading guilty to obstruction ofjustice.
Id. Prior to and following her incarceration, the debtor sought primarily non-legal
positions, and had, at one point, held a non-legaljob for which she earned $21,000
per year. Id. at 361-63. The court in Garrett denied the debtor's discharge petition
without closely examining whether, in spite of her incarceration, the debtor could
ever practice law. See id. at 363 (stating that debtor had failed to present evidence
that felony conviction would prevent debtor from ever becoming member of bar).
Rather, the court based its holding on a finding that the debtor's current income
from a non-legal position, combined with her husband's potential salary upon
graduation from a technical college, warranted denial of the petition regardless of
any effect her prior conviction might have on her ability to obtain more lucrative
employment. Id. at 363-64.
171. See Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman),
25 F.3d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that based on employment history, as
well as future prospects, debtor's financial condition would not improve considera-
bly even if she received position in her desired field).
172. See id. (permitting discharge where debtor's employment history sug-
gested that any job debtor received in chosen field would probably pay minimal
wages like those she received from her prior positions). Cf Dillon, 189 B.R. at 386
(finding that second prong of Brunner was not met where debtors expected to
receive raises and/or be promoted to full-time status); Healey, 161 B.R. at 396
(holding that debtor failed to satisfy second prong of Brunner because she antici-
pated obtaining employment with public school that paid more than salary she
received from private school where she was employed).
173. See Hawkins v. Buena Vista College (In re Hawkins), 187 B.R. 294, 299-
300 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995) (indicating that although debtor had been unable to
secure job paying much more than minimum wage in four years since her gradua-
tion, court believed that her difficulty would not extend over life of repayment
period because debtor was well-educated, healthy, had positive demeanor and,
therefore, could gain employment in other fields); see also Kraft, 161 B.R. at 86
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even physical disabilities or other medical problems do not constitute ex-
ceptional circumstances warranting discharge. 174
The Brunner standard, however, does present certain drawbacks for
debtors, creditors and courts. Even though numerous courts have
adopted the standard, they have applied the first two prongs of the test in
different ways, sometimes resulting in a debtor in one court receiving a
discharge based on the same circumstances that resulted in the denial of a
discharge of another's debt by a different court.1 75
Even if a debtor is fortunate enough to survive judicial scrutiny under
the first two prongs of Brunner, there is no guarantee that his or her educa-
tional debt will be discharged.176 To satisfy the "good faith" prong under
Brunner, a debtor must establish that he or she has attempted to repay the
(suggesting that debtor attempt to find better-paying job outside her chosen field
if employment future within chosen field is bleak).
174. See Cobb v. University of Toledo (In re Cobb), 188 B.R. 22, 24 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1995) (refusing to find undue hardship where debtor suffered from
epileptic seizures); Stebbins-Hopf v. Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. (In re
Stebbins-Hopf), 176 B.R. 784, 785 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (stating that debtor
had failed to satisfy Brunners second prong even though debtor had foot damage,
bronchitis and arthritis, debtor's daughter had epilepsy, debtor's mother had can-
cer and debtor's grandchildren had asthma); Daugherty v. First Tenn. Bank (In re
Daugherty), 175 B.R. 953, 959-60 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that debtor
who was suicidal and had other psychological and medical conditions had not satis-
fied "additional circumstances" requirement of Brunner); Sands v. United Student
Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 310-11 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994)(holding that debtor failed to show undue hardship where debtor had lost vision
in one eye and had ulcers on his feet).
175. Compare Ammirati v. Nellie Mae, Inc. (In re Ammirati), 187 B.R. 902,
906-07 (D.S.C. 1995) (finding that partial discharge was justified where debtor
presented evidence of health problems), with Cobb, 188 B.R. at 24 (rejecting
debtor's claim that his medical condition constituted unique circumstance war-
ranting discharge of educational debt), and Daugherty, 175 B.R. at 959-60 (rejecting
claim that debtor's suicidal condition presented extraordinary circumstance that
would justify finding that second prong of Brunner had been met). A similar "di-
vergent" result has occurred where the debtor has been faced with a considerable
monthly financial deficit. Compare Cheesman, 25 F.3d at 359-60 (holding that $400
monthly deficit required finding that debtors could not maintain minimum stan-
dard of living if forced to repay educational debt and, therefore, debt was dis-
chargeable), with Ipsen v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Ipsen), 149 B.R.
583, 584-85 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that debtor failed to satisfy first
prong of Brunner despite monthly deficit of $271).
176. See Healey, 161 B.R. at 397 (finding that even if debtor had satisfied first
two prongs of Brunner, her debt still would have been nondischargeable because
she failed to satisfy third prong of test). To a certain extent, the "good faith"
prong is intertwined with the other two prongs of the standard. See Wardlow v.
Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In reWardlow), 167 B.R. 147, 151 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1993) (holding that debtor's choice to spend resources on cable television
and other non-essentials constituted failure to satisfy first prong of Brunner and
also constituted lack of good faith attempt to repay educational debt); Kraft, 161
B.R. at 86 (stating that debtor did not demonstrate good faith because she was
unable to establish that financial woes would extend well into future).
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student loans. 17 7 Therefore, if the debtor has been unable to make pay-
ments on the student loans, he or she must establish attempts had been
made to negotiate deferments or to structure new payment schedules with
the lending agency. 178 Additionally, a court will often look to the timing
of the bankruptcy petition as a component of its good faith analysis:
where a debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition shortly after graduation,
before he or she has had adequate time to find employment and attempt
to repay the debt, a court is less likely to discharge the debt.1 79 Therefore,
177. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396
(2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Where the debtor has not made a single payment to
the lender, a court will typically find that the debtor has failed to make a good
faith effort to repay the loans. Daugherty, 175 B.R. at 960; Sands, 166 B.R. at 312.
Even if the debtor has made a few payments, the court will require that the debtor
establish the existence of forces beyond his or her reasonable control that have
made repayment impossible. See, e.g., Cobb, 188 B.R. at 24 (holding that debtor
who made two payments failed to satisfy "good faith" prong because educational
loans represented over 50% of his total debt and because he had not shown that
repayment was rendered impossible by forces beyond his control); Stebbins-Hopf
176 B.R. at 788 (holding that debtor failed to satisfy "good faith" prong where she
repaid $1,300 in interest on her loans and then ceased payment in order to give
money to family members for whom she was not legally responsible); Healey, 161
B.R. at 397 (stating that debtor failed to establish good faith where she made only
two payments on her loan totaling $174); Connor v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury
(In re Connor), 83 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that gainfully
employed debtor failed to establish good faith where she made no effort to repay
debt).
178. See Sands, 166 B.R. at 311 (stating that court measures good faith by ex-
amining debtor's payments toward student loans and debtor's efforts to negotiate
deferments with his or her particular lender). "Asking for a deferment is 'a less
drastic remedy available to those unable to pay [student loans] because of pro-
longed unemployment."' Id. at 312 (quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 397). Where a
debtor has attempted to work out a new payment schedule or has negotiated for
new deferment periods but has failed, a court may be more inclined to grant a
discharge. See Hawkins, 187 B.R. at 300 (noting that lender presented reasonable
alternative of fashioning repayment schedule that debtor should have considered
before filing discharge petition); Walcott v. USA Funds, Inc. (In re Walcott), 185
B.R. 721, 725 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995) (suggesting that debtor who had made only
one $50 payment on debt could have used money spent on long distance tele-
phone calls to make partial payment on loans); Healey, 161 B.R. at 397 (finding
that debtor had not established good faith where she made only two payments and
did not attempt to negotiate new payment arrangement with lender).
179. Sands, 166 B.R. at 312. In Sands, although the court had determined that
the debtor had failed to satisfy the first two prongs of the Brunner test, it nonethe-
less conducted an analysis of the "good faith" prong. Id. at 310-12. The court
stated that although the debtor had not made payments on his student loans, he
had obtained deferments of his loans over the two and one-half years between the
time he graduated from college and the time he filed his bankruptcy petition. Id.
at 312. The court ruled that the case before it was quite distinguishable from those
in which the debtor filed for bankruptcy within one year of his or her graduation
from school and made no arrangements to defer the debt or negotiate a restruc-
turing of the payment schedule. Id. (citing Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396; Healy, 161
B.R. at 397); see also Kraft, 161 B.R. at 86 (stating that debtor had failed to establish
good faith because she had filed for bankruptcy after being out of school for just
eighteen months and had not exhausted all options).
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if a debtor hopes to satisfy Brunners "good faith" prong, he or she must
make payments on the debt for at least a period of a few years and/or
contact the lender to negotiate new deferments or restructured payment
schedules before filing a petition for discharge.18 0
V. CONCLUSION
Even if a debtor follows the suggestions outlined above, there is no
guarantee that a court will find that the evidence presented warrants a
discharge of educational debt. The Brunner test has become a necessarily
stringent one, primarily because it requires the debtor to establish not
only a current inability to repay his or her student loans, but also to estab-
lish a significant probability that such financial inability will extend over a
large portion of the repayment period.1 8 '
By adopting the Brunner test, the Third Circuit in Faish has set forth a
uniform standard that must be applied within the jurisdiction to ensure
that the goals of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 are achieved.18 2 As a
result, it will be quite difficult for a debtor in the Third Circuit to have his
or her student loans discharged pursuant to section 523(a) (8) (B).183 Yet,
by enacting such a stringent standard, the Third Circuit has determined
that it must play an active role in preserving the student loan program. In
fact, the Third Circuit's holding acts to buoy a student loan program that
could disappear in the not-too-distant future if courts do not adopt a uni-
180. For a discussion of what a debtor must do to establish that he or she has
acted in good faith, see supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. Unless the
debtor has made attempts to repay the debt or work something out with the
lender, the debtor will typically be unable to show that the inability to repay the
debt was due to forces beyond "his or her reasonable control." See Brunner v. New
York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (stating that debtor's inability to make payments on debt must not be self-
imposed), affd, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
181. See Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756 (setting out prongs of test and noting that test
is stringent on debtors who attempt to shake free from chains of educational
debt).
182. See Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72
F.3d 298, 305-06 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that Brunner test closely comports with
scheme established by Congress in 1978 and permits courts to conduct logical
analysis of whether undue hardship exception is applicable), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2532 (1996). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Faish, see supra
notes 104-06, 119-38 and accompanying text.
183. See Faish, 72 F.3d at 306 (stating that debtor must satisfy each prong of
Brunner individually and that factors not contemplated within Brunner standard are
not to be examined); see also Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756 (recognizing that goal of test is
to make discharge of educational debt as difficult as possible without being inhu-
mane). For a discussion of the reasoning the Brunner court employed for the crea-
tion and implementation of its three-prong standard, see supra notes 81-87, 94-103
and accompanying text.
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form and logical standard of review that places an almost insurmountable
burden on a debtor who seeks to avoid a self-imposed obligation.18 4
Jonathan L. Marsh
184. See Faish, 72 F.3d at 305 (agreeing with Seventh Circuit's opinion in Mat-
ter of Roberson that goal of section 523 (a) (8) is to preserve student loan program
and require debtors to accept consequences of decision to borrow funds for educa-
tion); Greif, supra note 145, at 955 ("[B]y preventing discharge in cases where
repayment causes ordinary hardships or tight finances if the loan is repaid, the
[Brunner] test [as adopted in Faish] also upholds the legislative goals of preventing
misuse of the bankruptcy process and safeguarding the solvency and credibility of
the educational loan program."). The Third Circuit also recognized that it had to
step in and resolve the existing uncertainty regarding a proper standard of review
and how courts within the circuit should apply such a standard. Faish, 72 F.3d at
299-300 & n.1. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Roberson, see
supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the applicable legis-
lative history surrounding the enactment of section 523(a) (8) as part of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, see supra notes 21-28, 151-52 and accompanying text.
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